

NCCR Democracy

Varieties of democracy

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The normative principles of democracy can be combined in different ways in theory, and in practical implementations. As Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2007: 3) have pointed out, different strands in democratic theory do not differ with respect to the basic normative assumptions about democracy's essence, but in their emphasis on different dimensions of democracy. They are all variations on a general theme. Similarly, the different real existing democracies constitute varying attempts to implement these general underlying normative assumptions. They have implemented these principles through various formal institutional arrangements and informal practices and procedures. In this chapter, we shall conceptualize and empirically measure this variety within established democracies, based on the Democracy Barometer¹ - an empirical tool that has been developed in the framework of the NCCR Democracy. Our analysis is largely exploratory, an attempt to map out largely unexplored terrain. As we shall show, the really existing democracies differ considerably in the way they implement the basic principles. Furthermore, there are trade-offs involved in the implementation of the democratic principle: in the real world, it is impossible to maximize all its aspects evenly. Institutional designers have to make some hard choices when trying to make democracy work.

Probably the most famous attempt to put some order into the varieties of existing democracies is Lijphart's (1999) 'Pattern of democracies'. As he suggests, 'the enormous variety of formal

¹ <http://www.democracybarometer.org>

and informal rules and institutions that we find in democracies can be reduced to a clear two-dimensional pattern on the basis of the contrast between majoritarian and consensus government' (Lijphart 1999: 301). This famous typology is based on a limited number of 10 indicators for 36 established democracies, and extends and updates an earlier, similar attempt (Lijphart 1984). His measurement approach, which we shall follow here, relies not only on formal institutional rules, but also takes into account the way these institutions are used in a given country (the informal institutions). At the heart of his approach are the 'institutional rules and practices'.

Lijphart's two-dimensional conceptual map of democracies has been very influential, but it has been by no means the only typology proposed for sorting out the empirical variety of democracies. In another attempt to bring some order into the bewildering institutional variety, Lane and Ersson (1996) came up with a much more complex variety of possible empirical configurations than Lijphart. In their comparison of the institutional characteristics of the established West European democracies with the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, they used no less than five sets of dimensions along which the established democracies may vary. They conclude that there is a general variability of institutional conditions, which hardly allows for any systematic differences.

Indeed, the result of the empirical search for a few underlying dimensions of democracy is heavily contingent on the details of the empirical analysis. Thus, it depends on the set of analytical concepts we have in mind at the outset of our search, on the set of indicators we have at our disposal for the operationalization of each concept, on the set of countries we include in our analysis, and on the time period covered. Based on his theoretical concept of power-sharing, Lijphart expected that democracies can be distinguished between the consensus and the majoritarian type. His empirical results demonstrate, however, that the differences between 36 countries are more nuanced than expected, and he distinguishes two

different ways of sharing or dividing power – between actors within the central executive and legislative, versus power-sharing between different institutions.

Like Lane and Ersson, we shall start our analysis of the variety of democracies from a more differentiated set of conceptual dimensions, we shall make use of a more ample set of indicators than Lijphart, and we shall analyse a somewhat different set of 50 countries for the period of 1990-2007. The sample includes established democracies (all countries which are evaluated full democracies both by Freedom House and by the Polity IV index), and is limited only by the availability of data in the Democracy Barometer.²

Five dimensions of democracy

Starting from Lijphart's two dimensions, we move towards a more complete picture of democracy. To be sure, the operationalisation of a full-fledged picture of democracy is limited by the availability of appropriate indicators in our dataset, and by the existing empirical variance among democracies. Thus, for lack of reliable data we do not introduce a separate dimension referring to the situation of the media, although the media constitute a key condition for political communication today. We can, however, extend Lijphart's two-dimensional framework to a five-dimensional configuration of democracy. Our first addition concerns the distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies. Modern democracies are liberal democracies. Although the liberal principle may constrain the democratic principle, the institutionalization of the liberal principle constitutes a crucial requirement for the chain of accountability. It provides the basis for transparency, checks and balances, a functioning public sphere and the citizens' capacity to attribute responsibility. The dimension of direct

² Average Freedom House scores below 1.5 and Polity IV scores above 8 for the period 1995-2005, more than 250.000 inhabitants. Imputing only two indicators for a restricted number of countries, we have a complete dataset for 50 countries: the indicator for direct democracy (directd) is fully available for 35 countries, and imputed for the other 15 cases; the indicator for wage coordination is available for 49 countries, and imputed for one country.

versus representative democracy introduces the participatory element of democracy and takes into account the direct democratic channel in addition to the central representative democracy. Finally, the distinction between inclusive versus exclusive democracies refers to one of Dahl's (2000) five key criteria mentioned in the last chapter, and reflects whether or not the citizenry is fully included into democratic decision-making.

Lijpharts' two dimensions: consensus vs. majoritarian and federal vs. centralized democracies

The two dimensions in Lijphart's scheme reflect the degree to which power is concentrated in governments. The first dimension refers to the degree of shared responsibility in governments and legislatures, the second one to the division of power between different institutions (Lijphart 1999: 5). The indicators of his first dimension are directly or indirectly linked to two crucial institutions (Lijphart 1999: 303): proportional representation and a parliamentary system of government. Indeed, the electoral system constitutes the crucial formal element that is closely related to three other elements of this first dimension – the concentration of power in the executive (one party vs. coalition government), the relationship between the executive and the legislative (executive dominance vs. legislative dominance), and the party system (two vs. multi-party system). As a matter of fact, Lijphart's first dimension closely resembles the trade-off that Powell's (2000) showed between the proportional and the majoritarian visions of democracy, which is exclusively based on how the two basic electoral systems work. Powell shows that each vision arrives at realizing the goals it sets itself, at the cost of neglecting the goals of the competing vision. On the one hand, the majoritarian vision values concentrate power, which enables the elected representatives to carry out their promises (mandates) and clarifies the responsibility for government actions (transparency and vertical accountability). On the other hand, proportional representation is valued by its adherents for its ability to allow for authorized representation, i.e. for proportionate policy-making

influence of each group of voters. The vision of proportional democracy most closely resembles Dahl's (1956) pluralist idea that democracy is not majority rule, but the 'rule of minorities', who, proportionately represented, are forced to cooperate with one another to find majority support.

The second dimension in Lijphart's scheme refers to horizontal accountability, i.e. the division of power *between* institutions of government, the 'checks and balances' of the American Constitution. Empirically, however, it essentially boils down to a federalism-centralism dimension.

Liberal vs. illiberal democracies

Modern democracies combine the liberal and the democratic principles, they are liberal democracies. We consider the active involvement of the citizens in the public debates preceding the vote and its necessary guarantees – based on liberal rights and freedoms – as the baseline of what we call a democracy today.

Citizens require protection from the government's arbitrary decisions, as well as from each other. Liberalism sought to restrict the power of the monarch and of the Church. Its goal was freeing the polity from religious control and freeing civil society from political interference (Held 2006). Liberalism upholds the values of freedom of choice, reason and toleration. The liberal principle guarantees basic rights of the citizens – freedom of speech, freedom of association, protection of property rights, religious freedom, as well as equality before the law. According to the liberal principle the power of the state has constitutional limits, the modern state has to speak the language of law and the entire machinery of the state ought to be controlled by the law. The rule of law implies the submission of the state under the legal strictures. Constitutionalism, the division of power, checks and balances, and an independent judiciary in particular ought to guarantee the lawfulness of the state's actions. Democracies

combine the liberal freedoms with a strong and vivid civil society. It is, on the one hand, the embodiment of the freedom of association, in practice, filled by organisations of citizens which are not under direct state control. On the other hand, it serves as the intermediate body between the political institutions and the citizens, and hence creates the space for the public control over politics, and articulation of needs and demands.

Modern democracies combine this liberal principle with the democratic principles of popular equality ('one man one vote'), popular sovereignty ('government of the people, by the people, for the people') and the majoritarian principle, which is the baseline of most democratic decisions. As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, liberal and democratic principles are not necessarily compatible. The liberal principle limits the democratic principle to the extent that the citizens may exercise their popular sovereignty only within the constraints imposed by the legal order. 'Madisonian democracy', as Dahl (1956) has called a democracy that puts a heavy accent on the liberal principle, seeks to protect the liberties of certain minorities (of status, power, and wealth). In Dahl's (1956: 32) view, Madison went about as far as it was possible in his quest for preventing the 'tyranny of the majority' while still remaining within the bounds of what we call democracy. On the other hand, the democratic principles limit the liberal principle to the extent that the legal order can be arbitrarily modified by democratically legitimated political decisions. As the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke said about Yugoslavia in the 1990s: 'Suppose elections are free and fair and those elected are racists, fascists, separatists'³. Dahl (1956) has called a democracy, where the majority has unlimited power, a 'populist democracy', and he formulated a series of objections against the attempt to maximize popular sovereignty and political equality at the expense of all other political goals.

Where the citizens do not have strong liberal values, the conflict between the two principles is particularly acute. Zakaria (2007) paints a very bleak picture about the current relationship of

³ Cited by Zakaria (2007: 17)

the two sets of principles: they are, he maintains, coming apart across the globe. Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not'. We would like to suggest that the lack of liberalism is above all a problem in emerging democracies, i.e. in countries that have only recently made their transition to democracy. Their lack of liberalism is an indication that it takes time to develop the characteristics of an established democracy. Even Zakaria (2007: 56f.) concedes that we should not judge the new democracies, by standards that most Western countries would have flunked even thirty years ago'. We would like to add that not even all Western countries are capable of living up to these standards today.

Direct vs. representative democracies

As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, modern democracies are representative democracies. Elections of the political decision-makers at regular intervals constitute the key institution of representative democracy today (Manin 1995: 18; Powell 2000: 3). While Lijphart's dimensions have focused on the procedures and the outcome of elections – the electoral system and the format of the party system – the role of the citizen is not covered by his approach. The legal part of citizens' representation is universal suffrage, but in practice, good representation also requires high and equal participation in the elections. Although we will not be able to address this aspect of the general model, we would like to add that elections are instruments of democracy only to the extent that they give the citizens influence over policy making, i.e. to the extent that governments have the capacity to act on the citizens preferences, and to the extent that they are accountable and responsive to the preferences of the citizens, considered as political equals (Dahl 1971: 1).

Even if representative forms of democracy dominate today, direct democratic forms of political participation have not entirely disappeared. As we have also suggested in the previous chapter, the electoral channel coexist with direct democratic forms of government in

several countries, and the latter are, indeed, increasingly introduced in newly emerging democracies. In particular, the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe typically have introduced direct-democratic instruments.

In his recent contribution to the theory of democracy, Hendriks (2010) combines Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensus (non-majoritarian) democracies with the distinction between direct (self-governing) and indirect (representative) forms of democracy. The resulting four combinations he calls 'pendulum democracy' (the classic Westminster case), 'consensus democracy' (the classic consociational case), 'voter democracy' (the combination of majoritarian and direct forms of democracy) and 'participatory democracy' (the combination of consensual and direct forms of democracy). Voter democracy refers to 'unmediated popular rule'. Citizens participate by casting their votes in plebiscites, either in town meetings or in referendums. California-style referendums illustrate this type.

Participatory democracy in Hendrik's view refers to a very demanding form of democracy. In this version of democracy, decision-making involves 'a process of engaging in thorough, preferably transformative, and usually lengthy deliberations to seek consensus' (p. 28). In Hendrik's view (p. 137), Swiss democracy is a combination of elements from voter democracy and consensus democracy. Demanding less than Hendriks with respect to deliberation, one might, however, argue that the Swiss democracy illustrates precisely the combination of direct democratic elements with a consensus democracy, which is characteristic of Hendrik's participatory democracy, and which distinguishes it crucially from California-style referendums.

There have been some conceptual attempts to connect Lijphart's two models of democracy with direct democracy. Hug and Tsebelis (2002) show that direct democratic institutions introduce a new veto player into the political system - the median voter of the population. This argument has allowed Vatter (2009) to link them theoretically and empirically to the

Lijphart model, showing that referendums create an incentive for the extension of the governing coalitions. Neidhart (1970) has long ago argued that the risks arising from optional referendums and popular initiatives can be limited by co-opting all those forces into the governing coalition who are capable of efficiently threatening with the use of these instruments. Vatter's empirical analysis based on 23 of Lijphart's 36 countries and a modified list of 12 indicators confirms this hunch. He finds three dimensions: in addition to Lijphart's two original dimensions, he finds a third factor for direct democracy. As expected by his theoretical argument, the indicator for the concentration of power in the cabinet is also closely associated with this dimension (and not with the executive-party dimension as in Lijphart's analysis).

Inclusive vs. exclusive democracies

A last crucial criterion for democracy is the inclusion of all, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents in the democratic process (Dahl 2000: 37f.). Before the 20th century, this criterion was unacceptable to most advocates of democracy. Women were generally excluded from political rights, as were various classes of the population that were considered unfit, i.e. incompetent to participate. Today, some countries still effectively deny the right to vote to some parts of their population by requiring voters to register and by making access to registration procedures complicated. Most importantly, however, in an age of globalization more or less important parts of the resident populations in democratic countries are of foreign origin and, in most of them, they do not enjoy full citizenship rights in their country of residence.

With the construction of the nation-states, civic, political and social rights have become intimately linked to the membership in a national community, to national citizenship. Or, as Wimmer (2002: 57) has observed, ,the national idea has become the central principle accor-

ding to which modern society structures inclusion and exclusion, not only in the sphere of culture and identity, but also in the legal, political, military and social domains'. While foreign residents have acquired civic and social rights (Soysal 1994), they are still denied full political rights in most democracies.

Measurement

As already pointed out, we use the Democracy Barometer to operationalize our five dimensions of democracy. We have defined 19 indicators. Appendix 1 provides an exact definition for each one of them in terms of the original measures contained in the Democracy Barometer. For each indicator, the country values correspond to the average of the yearly values for the period 1990-2007. Taking averages over a more extended period provides us with a more stable assessment of the kind of democracy that has been implemented in a given country. *Appendices 2 and 3* present the statistical distribution and the correlation matrix of our 19 indicators.

Consensus vs. majoritarian democracy: We use five indicators for Lijphart's key dimension. Three of them (effective number of parties, electoral proportionality and proportionality of electoral system) are closely linked to the distinction between proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. The remaining two (wage coordination and union density) refer to the integration of interest groups into the political system, which is also part of Lijphart's first dimension. Our indicators measure the proportionality of elections, as we do not have suitable indicators for executive dominance, nor for cabinet composition, which are part of Lijphart's attempt to distinguish between consensus and majoritarian democracy. Lijphart's choice of indicators for these two concepts has been heavily criticized. With respect to executive dominance, Tsebelis (2002: 111) has pointed out that Lijphart attributed 'impressionistic' values to no less than 11 of his 36 countries for his indicator of this concept. Vatter (2009:

134) uses an improved indicator based on Siaroff (2003) and Schnapp and Harfst (2005). We did not use this indicator, however, because it is available for less than half of our set of countries, and only for a limited period of time. Vatter also criticizes Lijphart's use of the minimal winning one-party cabinets, since his category of single party cabinets includes both single-party minority cabinets (which are linked to consensual patterns of decision-making) and single-party majority cabinets. He proposes an improved version of this indicator, which is, however, again not (yet) available for a sufficient number of our cases. We would like to suggest, however, that the key characteristics of this dimension can be captured without these two types of indicators.

Lijphart has also been criticized for his inclusion of the interest groups in his first dimension. Thus, several authors (Keman and Pennings, 1995; Roller 2005: 111f.; Armingeon 2002: 88) proposed to reduce the first dimension to purely party-related characteristics. In this respect, we prefer to follow Lijphart, because one can make a strong argument in support of the institutional complementarity between consensus democracy in the party system and corporatist-like arrangements in the interest group system, on the one hand, and between majoritarian democracy in the party system and pluralist-like arrangements in the interest group system, on the other hand (see, e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001).

Federal vs. centralized: For Lijphart's second dimension, we have two indicators at our disposal. Following Vatter (2009), we distinguish between two different aspects of federalism and decentralization – one referring to the constitutional division of territorial power and one for the fiscal division of territorial power – and add bicameralism as a third indicator, which is also used by Lijphart. We dropped Lijphart's indicator for central bank autonomy, which is not inherently linked to the federalism-centralization dimension. In fact, in Vatter's (2009: 143f.) analysis, this indicator is more closely associated with Lijphart's first dimension.

With respect to judicial review – part of the federalism-centralization dimensions by Lijphart and Vatter, we expect that it is associated with the liberalism or the direct democracy dimension. The liberal principle includes an emphasis on checks and balances, especially on an independent judiciary. By contrast, direct democratic procedures may have ‚populist‘ tendencies, which limit the possibilities of judicial review, since they attribute decisive competences to the people as sovereign.

Liberal vs. illiberal democracies: In addition to the indicator for judicial review, we have six indicators for this dimension. They measure equality before the law, property rights, freedom of the press, government capacity, the existence of a powerful civil society, unconventional political participation and representation of women.

While the first three may seem obvious indicators for this dimension, the remaining four need some additional comments. Government capacity is an indicator intended to measure the submission of the state under the law. Effective unconventional participation is both an indicator of the effective use of the freedom of association, and an indicator for the effective use of the freedom of speech. The adequate representation of women is also an indicator of the equality before the law and of the freedom to associate, but it is probably less exclusively linked to this dimension than the other indicators, since it also has a link to the equality of participation (i.e. to the representation vs. direct democracy dimension) and the equality of representation (i.e. to the consensus vs. majoritarian democracy dimension). Finally, judicial review of political decisions has the function to protect the liberal rights and freedoms and the rule of the law against the tyranny of the majority, and therefore also belongs to the liberal principle.

Representative vs. direct democracy: We operationalize this dimension with turnout and equality of electoral participation (for representative democracy), and the frequency of national referendums (for direct democracy).

Inclusive vs. exclusive: We have only a single indicator for the inclusiveness of the democracies, the share of registered voters among the adult population.

The overall configuration

The overall distribution of values provides us with a first rough idea of the characteristics of our sample of 50 countries. Our sample consists of rather centralized and unicameral democracies, with a high degree of inclusion, proportional electoral systems, and hardly any democracies with direct democratic elements. The sample is inclusive, as only four countries (Estonia, Luxembourg, South Africa, USA) count less than 80% of their voting age population in their voting registers. Most countries also count very low degrees of disproportionalities, below or around 10 (on a scale from 0 to 100), including even majoritarian democracies, such as Australia (10.0) or the USA (3.5). The US example confirms that very proportional election outcomes can even be reached under plurality rule, if minor parties hardly win any votes. There are only few exceptions with higher disproportionalities, notably France (19.3), Turkey (18.1), the UK (15.8), and Canada (13.1). With regard to the practice of direct democracy, Switzerland is a clear outlier, with a score of 80 referendums in the 5 year-average, followed only by Italy with 31 referendums. Most countries had no or hardly any referendums at the national level. Finally, two thirds of our countries have a unicameral parliament, and three quarters are unitary (non-federal) states. Just like our predecessors, we have performed an exploratory factor analysis, in order to uncover the underlying dimensions of our 19 indicators. The result of this analysis is presented in *Table 1*.

<Table 1>

The overall configuration corresponds to our expectations. There are, indeed, no less than five dimensions for the characterization of the 50 democracies. These five dimensions correspond to our five theoretically defined dimensions. In a factor analysis, the relative importance of a

resulting dimension (as measured by its Eigenvalue) heavily depends on the number of indicators used for its operationalization. It is, therefore, not very surprising that the liberal dimension, for which we had more indicators at our disposal than for the other dimensions turns out to be the most important one, and the inclusiveness dimension, for which we had just one suitable indicator, the least important one. Substantively, however, all five dimensions are of equal importance to us.

With few exceptions, the configuration of the loadings also corresponds to our expectations. The indicators we attributed to a given dimension generally are most closely associated with the corresponding theoretical dimension. Some of the indicators load substantially on more than one dimension, which is not quite unexpected either. Thus, union density is both associated with the consensus-majoritarian dimension, which covers the main aspects of consensus democracy, but also with the liberal-illiberal and the federal-centralized dimension. Wage coordination is not only associated with the consensus-majoritarian dimension, but even more closely with the inclusiveness dimension. The representation of women is associated with the liberal and the consensus-majoritarian dimensions. The biggest exception to our expectations probably refers to the negative association of judicial review with the liberal dimension. While its trade-off with direct democracy was to be expected, its negative association with the liberal dimension is something, we shall look into more closely below.

Given that one of the five dimensions – direct democracy – is so closely associated with a specific country – Switzerland, we have rerun our analysis excluding the Swiss case. It turns out that the overall configuration does not change very much, if the Swiss case is excluded⁴. However, the indicators for direct democracy and turnout become less closely associated with the fourth dimension, which means that this dimension becomes more of an equal participation dimension.

⁴ Compared to Table 1, the Eigenvalues of four dimensions change only little, whereas the Eigenvalue of the representative-direct democracy dimension drops substantially: 4.8/4.9, 2.1/1.9, 1.6/1.7, 1.6/1.0, 1.1/1.2.

The positioning of the democracies in the five-dimensional space

The fact that we have uncovered no less than five underlying dimensions to the democratic space means that we can regroup the variety of democracies in quite different ways. We shall present some of the possible classifications in order to show the different configurations of democracies.

Let us start with a focus on the liberal-illiberal dimension. The characteristic of this dimension is that it does not involve any trade offs. The more liberal a democracy is according to our measurement, the better it implements the basic preconditions for accountability. Thus, liberal democracies are clearly superior to illiberal ones. We shall combine the liberal dimension with the two dimensions of Lijphart's typology in order to see how the democracies as defined by Lijphart fare in terms of the liberal-illiberal dimension. *Figure 1* presents the combination of the consensus-majoritarian with the liberal-illiberal dimension. In this figure, we divide the space created by the combination of these two dimensions into four quadrants, which correspond to four types of democracies – liberal-consensus democracies, liberal-majoritarian democracies, illiberal-consensus democracies, and illiberal-majoritarian democracies. The terms are to be understood in a relative sense. All of these countries are democracies, but some are more consensual or liberal than others.

<Figure 1>

What immediately strikes the eye is the greater liberalism of the long established democracies in Western Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon world. Young democracies of Latin America (Peru – PER, Columbia – COL, Venezuela – VEN, Mexico – MEX) and of South-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria – BGR, Romania – ROU, Croatia – HRV) are less liberal than the democracies with a longer historical record. The same is the case, to a more limited extent for the Democracies of Southern (Spain-ESP, Italy-ITA, Portugal-PRT, Cyprus-CYP, Malta-

MLT) and Central Europe (Hungary-HUN, Czech Republic-CZE, Poland-POL, Slovenia-SVN), and of Africa (South Africa-ZAF).

Among the liberal democracies, we find a clear separation between the Anglo-Saxon, majoritarian group of countries (GBR, USA, CAN, AUS, NZL), and the consensus democracies of Scandinavia (Denmark-DNK, Finland-FIN, Iceland-ISL, Norway-NOR, and Sweden-SWE) and the North-West of the European continent (Belgium-BEL, Germany-DEU, Luxemburg-LUX, the Netherlands-NLD). The most liberal democracies turn out to be Denmark and Finland on the consensus side, and Australia, Canada and New Zealand on the majoritarian side. All of these countries are characterized by very high values for equality before the law, governing capacity, and property rights. What distinguishes them is unconventional participation (higher on the majoritarian side) and women's representation (higher on the Scandinavian side). Surprisingly, two traditional consensus democracies, Switzerland-CHE and Austria-AUT, turn out to be on the margin between consensus and majoritarian countries. This is because our consensus-majoritarian dimension measures the formal institutions (electoral system and its direct consequences), rather than the functioning of the government, and many Swiss and Austrian institutions are proportional only within limits.

The rather illiberal democracies tend to be less clearly divided on the consensus dimension. Many of them tend towards the middle ground. Only Turkey-TUR with weak trade unions, and a unique 10 percent legal threshold for national elections, which over long stretches results in a dominant majority party system, appears as the by far most majoritarian country of our dataset. South Africa-ZAF, whose institutions have been deliberately designed with the consensus model in mind, constitutes the proportional extreme. In South Africa, the transitional Constitution of 1993 had imposed the formation of grand coalition governments (all parties with more than 5 percent of the vote had to form a 'Government of National Unity'). The result was a consensual decision-making process (Lijphart 1998: 144). Under the

final Constitution, South Africa has a proportional electoral system and a most proportional electoral outcome, although it has a very low effective number of parliamentary parties and a high concentration of the parliamentary seats (in the hands of the ANC). This suggests that Lijphart's key dimension is mainly relevant for the long-established democracies, while it has less purchase for the characterization of the emerging democracies.

Next, we combine the liberal with the federal-centralized dimension, as illustrated in *Figures 2a and 2b*. The countries are regrouped on both sides of the liberal-illiberal divide. We find that the group of illiberal countries usually has a highly centralized administration (measured by fiscal centralization), as indicated by the negative slope of the regression line ($r=-.34$), with Brasil (BRA), Argentina (ARG), India (IND) and Turkey (TUR) being among the few exceptions (*Figure 2a*). Once we exclude these four countries, the slope of the regression line becomes clearly more negative. Taking all three indicators of centralization and decentralization into account (*Figure 2b*), we find that many of the fiscally centralized countries in fact do have a federal or decentralized structure of their state administration, but tend not to provide the lower levels of administration with sufficient funds (Falleti 2005). In *Figure 2b*, we observe a clear contrast between post-communist countries and others. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe all belong to the illiberal-centralized field, whereas most young democracies in Latin America, South and South-East Asia (India IND and Philippines PHL), and South Africa belong to the illiberal, but federal-decentralised group of countries, with the notable exceptions of Costa Rica (CRI) and South Korea (KOR). On the liberal side, Germany, Switzerland and the US are the highly federal countries, Australia and Canada among the decentralized democracies, too. All the other democracies in this sample are more or less centralized.

<Figure 2>

Given our attempt to operationalize the two dimensions of Lijphart's typology, we are also able to reconstruct his two-dimensional conceptual map. *Figure 3* presents the results in three parts. The first image in *Figure 3* reconstructs Lijphart's map for the 24 countries which are included both in his and our own sample, using his data for the period 1971-1996. The second image reconstructs the map for the same 24 countries, but now using our data and our model for the year 1995, which overlaps with Lijphart's period. The third image corresponds to the reconstruction of the same map, but for all the 50 countries in our sample, using our data and our model for the 1995-2007. Overall, the three images are rather similar. Lijphart's two dimensions correlate at .77 and .84, respectively, with the corresponding dimensions from our model, when we use the data for 1995 for the set of 24 countries. The correlations are .71 and .83 respectively, if we replace the data for 1995 with the means for the entire period 1990-2007, and include the 50 best democracies. The magnitude of these correlations and the similarity of the resulting images suggest that the two dimensions are quite robust: even if we modify the set of indicators, the period covered or the set of countries included, the resulting configurations of countries turn out to be rather stable.

<Figure 3>

Although the overall configurations are remarkably similar, some countries have a somewhat different position in our space for 1990-2007 than in Lijphart's space for 1971-1996. This may point to differences in measurements, but it is certainly also a result of institutional change. Thus, Italy has become both more federal and more majoritarian in our configuration for 1995-2007, which is a reflection of the regionalization and the adoption of a new electoral system which have taken place in Italy in the meantime. Japan has made a similar shift towards a more federal and more majoritarian position, again as a result of a change in its electoral system from SNTV to a mixed system in 1994. Switzerland, to mention a third example, no longer is an extreme case, which is a consequence of the slightly different set of

indicators that we rely upon. As already mentioned, we measure the proportional features of the system, and do not have indicators for the consensus-oriented governing style (large coalitions, etc.). Austria becomes more centralised, Iceland and Belgium due to their large (and, in the case of Belgium very regionalised) party systems and low disproportionality more proportional. France moves to the majoritarian end, due to very high disproportionality of the two-round majority electoral system, and low union density. The 26 democracies that had not been covered by Lijphart are spread out along the centralization-decentralization dimension, but, as we have already pointed out, they vary less on the consensus-majoritarian dimension, which leads to a crowded center space. Overall, the democracies not covered by Lijphart are slightly more majoritarian than his original cases.

With our five dimensions, we can also reconstruct Hendrik's (2010) four-fold typology empirically. *Figure 4* presents the configuration we obtain, if we combine the consensus-majoritarian dimension with the direct-democracy dimension. The resulting configuration sets Switzerland apart. As we have suggested in our conceptual discussion, it is this country that most closely resembles Hendrik's 'participatory democracy'. In the other countries, direct-democratic elements are much less developed, but apart from Luxembourg and Italy, several new democracies are also rather on the direct-democratic side (especially Poland, Slovenia, and several Latin American democracies). The specificity of the Swiss case becomes even more apparent, when we combine the direct-democratic dimension with the federal one, as is illustrated in *Figure 5*. It is the combination of direct-democratic institutions with federalism which sets Switzerland apart from all the other countries. The Latin American countries Brazil, Venezuela, and Columbia adopt a similar combination of federalism and direct democracy, but in a much less pronounced way, while old federal cases (USA, Germany, Austria, Canada) do not have any direct democratic elements at the national level.

<Figures 4 and 5>

Finally, let us also briefly refer to our last dimension – inclusiveness, which refers to the inclusiveness of voting rights, and wage coordination, as a measure of inclusion of the labour unions in policy-making. *Figure 6* illustrates the combination between federalism and inclusiveness. Surprisingly, the relationship between the two dimensions is curvilinear: both highly federal and highly centralized countries are less inclusive than countries of average centralization. The most exclusive democracies are the US, Australia and South Africa on the federal side, and Estonia, Luxembourg, and Lithuania on the centralized side. In the US and in South Africa, registration for voting still poses a problem for some groups of voters. In Europe, the most exclusive country is Estonia, where large parts of the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian minorities do not have citizenship rights, Luxembourg, where due to a large number of immigrants, the voting population is fairly restricted, and Lithuania, with an unequal labour market (similar to other countries in the region, Estonia, and Poland).

<Figure 6>

Trade offs

As we have seen, there are different visions of democracy, which cannot all be implemented at one and the same time. This means that there are trade offs between the democratic ideals that can be attained by real world democracies. We have already pointed to one of these trade offs in our previous discussion.

The key insight that there are trade offs between various aspects of the democratic ideal has been clearly put into evidence by the studies of Lijphart (1999) and Powell (2000) who have, each one in his own way, tried to focus on the key dilemmas faced by democratic institutional engineering. The key trade off which they have put into evidence is the one involved in our second dimensions, which we have modelled based on their reasoning – the trade-off between vertical accountability and what Powell calls ‘effective authorized representation’. Majorita-

rian democracy maximizes vertical accountability, while consensus democracy maximizes effective representation.

Gallagher's disproportionality index, which we take as our measure for effective representation correlates very closely ($r=-.87$) with the consensus-majoritarian dimension (see *Table 1*), which is indicative of the trade off in question. *Figure 7* illustrates the trade off for our 50 countries. Note that this figure very closely resembles Powell's (2000: 235, Figure 10.1) illustration of the trade off between majoritarian and proportional processes. While disproportionality is closely related to the proportional-majoritarian dimension, two majoritarian countries do slightly better on this trade-off: The US have a fairly low degree of disproportionality, because there are very few votes cast for small parties, whereas in India, the regional differentiation of the party system leads to more proportionality. The US proved to be exceptional in Powell's analysis, too. However, the other exception in Powell's study – Germany – no longer appears to be exceptional according to our data, since it turns out to be much more consensual than according to Powell's measurements.

<Figure 7>

Powell also had introduced a measure for the politicians' *responsiveness* to their voters' preferences by comparing the median voters' position on the left-right scale with the corresponding position of the median legislators. In his analysis, the proportional vision of democracy proved to be unambiguously more responsive than the majoritarian vision. In other words, vertical accountability can only be increased at the cost of decreasing responsiveness. We can confirm this relationship, using the Democracy Barometer's indicator for responsiveness (*issuecongr*), which is constructed in line with Powell's indicator. *Figure 8* provides the illustration. The correlation between the consensus-majoritarian dimension and issue congruence has the expected sign, but is not significant for the whole sample of 50 countries (-.17). However, once we remove two outliers, it becomes quite substantial (-.34) and highly

significant. The two outliers include an 'overperformer' (Canada), whose politics are highly responsive in spite of its majoritarian system, and an 'underperformer' (South Africa), whose politics are less responsive than we would have expected on the basis of its position on the consensus dimension.

<Figure 8>

The third dimension in our conceptual map also involves the expected clear-cut trade off between direct and representative democracy, a trade-off between effective and equal participation in the representative channel and the number of national referendums. As has been argued by Swiss scholars (Linder 1994: 132-4), elections are less important in a system like the Swiss one, where the voters do not provide their representatives with a generalized credit of support for the duration of a legislative period, but where they can withdraw their support selectively in specific direct-democratic votes in the course of a legislative period. In a related argument, Franklin (2004: 92-98) credits the low electoral turnout in Switzerland to the lack of accountability in the Swiss system, where elections have not changed the composition of the government since the formation of the grand coalition between the four major parties in 1959⁵. The link between Franklin's argument and the effect of direct-democratic institutions is provided by Vatter's argument discussed above, which maintains that direct-democratic institutions provide an incentive for the extension of government coalitions to all major parties.

This trade off is illustrated by *Figure 9*. Our indicator for direct-democracy is highly negatively correlated with this dimension (-.73). The size of this correlation is largely attributable to the Swiss case, but even if we leave out this outlier, the correlation is still important (-.38) and significant. In the paradigmatic Swiss case, strong direct democratic influence, indeed, goes together with very low electoral participation and, correspondingly,

⁵ Since Franklin's book has been published, the composition of the Swiss government has again been changed after the elections in 2003 and after a party split in 2008.

very high electoral political inequality. For both of these indicators, Switzerland has the lowest values in this sample. As Linder (1994: 134) has observed, 'it seems that we cannot have it both ways. Maximum influence in both votations and elections are impossible to realise in the same political system. We are therefore limited to looking for 'optimal' voters' influence'.

<Figure 9>

There are some other, less well known trade offs involved in our conceptual map of democracy as well. One concerns the liberal dimension: quite surprisingly, there is a trade off between the extent to which democracies have implemented the liberal principle and judicial review. We had expected judicial review to be part of the liberal-illiberal dimension, but actually it is negatively correlated with this dimension ($r=-.43$). The reason is that the new democracies, which tend to have difficulties with the implementation of the liberal principle, also tend to have institutionalized procedures for judicial review, while some of the established democracies do not know such procedures. The most extreme case is, of course, the UK, where Parliament is sovereign and the judiciary has no effective possibility to control political decisions. Similarly, in Switzerland the Supreme Court's authority is heavily curtailed by the direct democratic procedures, which attribute sovereignty to the electorate (and which is also the reason why judicial review is positively associated with the representative democracy, see *Table 1*). The Netherlands and New Zealand also belong to the group of established democracies with only limited procedures of judicial review. Once we remove these four outliers, the relationship between the liberal dimension and judicial review weakens, but remains negative ($-.27$) (*Figure 10*).

<Figure 10>

As we have already discussed with respect to *Figure 2a*, there is also a rather close relationship between the liberal dimension and fiscal centralization (correlation of $-.34$): the

more recent, rather illiberal democracies tend to be more fiscally centralized than the established, more liberal ones. There does not, however, seem to be a trade off involved here, because the more liberal democracies are roughly equally divided between fiscally centralized and decentralized countries. There just happen to be no fiscally decentralized countries among the new more illiberal democracies.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have made an attempt to map out the variety of really existing democracies. Our exploratory analysis has shown that there are, indeed, quite different ways to implement the democratic principles, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages. This is all but trivial. Most importantly, this idea of multiple versions of the democratic ideal challenges the existing indices of the quality of democracy. All of these indices assume a unidimensional model of democracy, which allows for ranking the countries on a scale ranging from more to less democratic. The most well-known of these indices, which are habitually used by researchers to measure the quality of democracy of the different countries, are the Freedom House and the Polity IV index. These indices have, for example, been used by most studies of democratization which we have presented in Chapter 2. The Democracy Barometer also allows to assess the quality of democracies on a unidimensional scale. Contrary to the established indices, which rate all the countries in the world, the Democracy Barometer has, however, been designed to provide a more detailed assessment of the world's best democracies, which reach the top values on the scales of the established indices⁶.

⁶ [New Democracy Barometer shows how democratic the 30 best democracies are](#), NCCR Newsletter No.8, February 2011, [Die Vermessung freier Gesellschaften - Das Demokratiebarometer bietet ein differenziertes Bild](#) WZB Mitteilungen, Heft 131, März 2011

The question is, of course, how these unidimensional scales of democracy relate to our five dimensional space of democracy. We have empirically tested this question by predicting the average scores of the various countries for the period 1990-2007 on the three indices – Freedom House, Polity IV and Democracy Barometer – by their values on our five dimensions. The Freedom House index provides a value for all of our 50 countries, Polity IV for 47 of them (excluding Iceland, Luxemburg, and Malta), and the Democracy Barometer assesses a subset of these 50 countries – the sample 30 best democracies⁷. *Table 2* presents the results, using straightforward OLS-regressions⁸.

<Table 2>

As it turns out, the quality assessments of all three indices is above all a function of the implementation of the liberal principle. Their scale values most heavily depend on the countries' scores on the liberal-illiberal dimension. In the case of Freedom House, the sign is negative, because the Freedom House scale assigns higher values to non-democratic regimes. This result is very interesting. On the one hand, it is not surprising at all, since the liberal-illiberal dimension is the one that does not include any trade-offs. In other words, the indices measure mainly the one dimension which allows for a clear ranking in terms of the fundamental principles. On the other hand, with two exceptions, these indices have very little to say about the comparative advantages of the varieties of democracy in terms of the other four dimensions. The first exception concerns the consensus-majoritarian dimension. Both the Democracy Barometer and the Freedom House scores confirm Lijphart's (1999) contention that consensus democracies are 'better', i.e. 'kinder and gentler' than majoritarian

⁷ Democracy Barometer scores measuring the quality of democracy are available for 30 countries, with a value of 1.5 or below on the combined Freedom House Scores *and* a Polity IV Score of 9 or above during the whole time span between 1995 and 2007.

⁸ One might argue that OLS-regressions are not appropriate for predicting the Freedom House and Polity IV values. In their case, the data are largely right-censored, given that the countries in the subset of the 30 best democracies reach the maximum value on the respective scales or fall only slightly short of it. In order to check for this sensitive issue, we have rerun our analyses for these two scales using censored-normal regression. Substantively, the results are largely identical with the ones presented in Table 2, although the variance explained is much more limited (Pseudo-R²=.26 in both cases).

democracies. Both indicators suggest that for the 50 countries included in the analysis (Freedom House scores), and the 30 countries of the blueprint sample of the Democracy Barometer, consensus democracies turns out to be significantly 'more democratic' than majoritarian democracies. The second exception regards the third and the fifth dimension. For the countries included in our sample, Freedom House tends to rate more centralized and rather exclusive models of democracy as better democracies.

We would like to conclude by pointing out that the exercise in this chapter is only a beginning. Next, we should explore the correlates of the variety of democracies. Except for the liberal dimension which has essentially been operationalized by the established indices, and except for Lijphart's (1999) discussion of the determinants of consensus democracy, this is a largely open task. We should also explore the validity and reliability of our five dimensions: are they, indeed, the key dimensions along which really existing democracies tend to vary, and are they stable over time and over different country samples? We do not maintain that we have found the definite set of dimensions, but our results suggest that there is definitely more variation than that which is captured by the existing indices (Freedom House and Polity IV), or by the dominant (Lijphart's) typology.

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Table 1: Results of exploratory factor analysis: n=50

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Uniqueness
	Liberal-illiberal	Federalist-centralized	Consensus-majoritarian	Representative-direct-democratic	inclusive-exclusive	
equality before law	0.94	0.16	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.081
governing capacity	0.97	-0.02	0.08	0.03	-0.01	0.058
property rights	0.91	-0.05	-0.11	0.03	0.13	0.149
non-conv participation	0.66	-0.16	0.17	0.02	-0.05	0.504
freedom of press	0.83	0.10	0.18	-0.07	-0.19	0.228
women representation	0.61	-0.12	0.41	0.17	0.17	0.384
judicial review	-0.42	0.07	0.15	0.39	-0.25	0.579
unitary (no territorial division)	0.01	0.83	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.315
single chamber (no bicameralism)	0.21	0.77	-0.03	0.13	0.07	0.339
fiscal centralization	-0.33	0.55	0.22	0.02	-0.18	0.507
eff number of parl parties	0.00	-0.12	0.34	-0.40	0.29	0.626
proportionality (effective magnitude)	-0.10	0.19	0.58	-0.09	0.40	0.456
disproportionality (Gallagher index)	0.17	-0.05	0.79	-0.03	0.01	0.339
wage coordination	0.12	-0.11	0.31	0.00	0.66	0.440
union density	0.37	0.32	0.50	0.22	0.08	0.465
equality of participation	0.13	-0.01	-0.03	0.75	0.15	0.400
turnout	0.31	0.19	0.33	0.38	0.00	0.615
referendums/direct democracy	0.05	-0.31	-0.01	-0.64	0.10	0.483
inclusion	-0.11	0.38	-0.08	0.11	0.59	0.472
EW rotated solution	4.79	2.10	1.85	1.55	1.26	

Table 2: The quality of democracy as assessed by the Polity IV, Freedom House, and Democracy Barometer, explained by our five dimensions, unstandardized regression coefficients and t-values, for average values during the period 1990-2007

	Polity4 b/t	Freedom House b/t	Democracy Barometer b/t
Liberal- Illiberal	1.148*** -6.05	-1.408*** (-11.84)	14.019*** -5.49
Federal- Centralized	0.253 -1.23	-0.470*** (-3.67)	-0.102 (-0.05)
Consensus- Majoritarian	-0.095 (-0.46)	0.291* -2.25	-5.162* (-2.74)
Direct- Representative	-0.298 (-1.40)	0.159 -1.19	1.129 -0.62
Inclusive- exclusive	-0.26 (-1.19)	0.377** -2.82	3.414 -1.6
_cons	8.937*** -47.77	3.504*** -30.06	56.509*** -23.65
adj. R ²	0.43	0.77	0.62
N	47	50	30

Significance levels: *=.05, **=.01, ***=.001

Figure 1: liberal vs. illiberal and consensus vs. majoritarian democracies




Figure 2a: liberal vs. illiberal democracies and fiscal centralization




Figure 2b: liberal vs. illiberal and federalist vs. centralized democracies






Figure 3: Lijphart's typology – consensus-majoritarian vs. federalist-centralized

a) Replication of Lijphart with his own data 1971-1996, n=24



b) Replication of Lijphart with our data 1995, n=24



c) Replication of Lijphart with our data, 1990-2007, N=50




Figure 4: Hendrik (2010): consensus-majoritarian and direct-representative democracy




Figure 5: representative-direct democracy and federalist-centralized





Figure 6: federalist-centralized and inclusiveness¹⁾

Curvilinear relation at the 95% significance level.



Figure 7: Proportionality of representation and consensus-majoritarian¹⁾Correlation: $-.87$

Figure 8: Issue congruence and consensus-majoritarian¹⁾

Correlation: -.17, after exclusion of South Africa and Canada -.34.



Figure 9: direct democracy and representative democracy¹⁾¹⁾correlation without CH: -.39

Figure 10: liberal-illiberal democracies and judicial review¹⁾

Correlation $-.43$, without outliers: $-.27$.

Appendix 1: Definition of the 19 indicators

Indicator	description	Names in the Democracy Barometer
Consensus-majoritarian		
Effective number of parliamentary parties	Effective number of parliamentary parties	enpp
Electoral proportionality	reversed Gallagher Index, which essentially compares the distribution of seats in Parliament with the distribution of votes on the different parties	gallagindex
Proportionality of the electoral system	We take the log of the minimum of mean district magnitude (meandistrict) and legal electoral thresholds (dpi_thresh). The log takes into account the decreasing marginal importance of additional seats in the electoral district. Following Lijphart (1994), we also convert legal electoral thresholds into the equivalent of mean district magnitude, to account for electoral systems which are restrictive due to high legal thresholds.	elsystem = $\log_n(\min\{\text{meandistrict}, 100/\text{dpi_thresh}\})$
Wage coordination	Index of degree of coordination of wage bargaining, from 1 (bargaining at company level) to 5 (economy-wide bargaining) (Visser 2011)	wcoord
Union density	Union membership as a percentage of wage and salary earners	union
Federalist-centralized		
Constitutional division of territorial power	Federalism	nonfed
bicameralism	Non-bicameralism	nonbicam
Sub-national fiscal autonomy	Mean of two measures of fiscal decentralization: subnational expenditures as a percentage of the total national expenditures (subexp), and subnational revenues as a percentage of the total national revenues (subrev)	subexp, subrev
Liberal-illiberal		
Equality before the law	Mean of two indices measuring effective impartiality of the legal system (impcourts) and the integrity of the legal system (integrlegal)	impcourts, integrlegal
Freedom of press	Mean of two indices of informational openness, measuring the legal environment of press freedom (legmedia) and the lack of effective political control of the media (polmedia)	legmedia and polmedia
Effective property rights	mean of the legal protection of private property (propright) and a measure of de-facto protection of personal security and private property (secprop)	propright and secprop
Government capacity	an index we created from a combination of indicators for conditions of efficient implementation – a public service independent from political interference (publser), bureaucracy quality (bureau) and effective implementation of government decisions (govdec), as well as indicators for the absence of corruption (bribcorr, CPI) and the willingness for transparent communication (transp) (see <i>Appendix 4a</i>).	publser, bureau, govdec, bribcorr, transp
Effective unconventional	an index we created from a combination of indica-	memhum,

participation	tors for freedom of association (memhuman, memenviron), which measure membership in humanitarian and environmental/animal rights organizations respectively, and effective and equal non-institutionalized participation (petitions, and a summary indicator of different forms of inequalities in non-institutional participation, par_eqpa3) (see <i>Appendix 4b</i>).	memenviron, petitions, par_eqpa3
Adequate representation of women	the proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament in percent of all seats	womrep
Judicial review	Mean of two measures of the possibility that courts can review the constitutionality of laws (judrev) and whether the judiciary has the final say over all laws (powjudi).	judrev, powjudi
Direct-representative		
Turnout	the participation rate in percent of the registered electorate in parliamentary elections of respective or previous years (parlvote)	parlvote
Equality of electoral participation	a summary index composed of four indicators, measuring inequalities in turnout with regard to education, income (repturnined), gender, and age (repturngeag).	Returned, repturngeag
Frequency of national referendums	the number of national referendums voted in a given year (ref_nat). We rely on the logarithm of the number of national referendums (increased by 1) to take into account the declining marginal importance of additional referendums.	ref_nat
Inclusive-exclusive		
inclusion	the registered voters as a percentage of voting age population	regprovap

Appendix 2: 19 indicators for 50 advanced democracies, averages 1990-2007

country	code	equality before law	governing capacity	property rights	non-con- participation	freedom of press	women representation	eff number of parl parties	proportionality (district)	disproportionality (Gallagher index)	wage coordination	union density	equality of participation	turnout	referendums/ direct democracy	judicial review	unitary (no territorial division)	single chamber (no bicameralism)	fiscal centralization	inclusion
Argentina	ARG	12.8	34.0	34.9	24.0	28.7	29.2	23.8	2.4	-10.7	49.6	33.4	0.6	78.3	5.1	50.0	0.0	1.0	29.4	99.3
Australia	AUS	88.4	87.5	94.7	75.9	83.3	33.7	6.8	0.0	-10.0	27.8	28.6	0.9	95.2	2.2	100.0	0.0	0.0	39.9	86.9
Austria	AUT	83.8	74.8	100.2	48.2	59.8	51.8	18.0	3.0	-1.9	75.0	38.3	0.7	82.2	1.4	50.0	1.0	2.0	53.1	92.2
Belgium	BEL	62.9	55.8	81.0	71.0	84.4	44.1	86.1	2.0	-3.6	84.7	53.4	0.7	91.4	0.0	50.0	0.2	1.0	70.6	92.4
Brazil	BRA	18.4	37.2	30.6	52.0	37.2	10.8	88.7	2.9	-3.7	58.2	30.2	0.3	79.5	15.7	75.0	0.0	0.0	38.0	97.9
Bulgaria	BGR	20.3	23.4	9.1	20.1	31.8	31.0	14.7	2.0	-7.0	31.3	41.1	0.7	68.1	1.2	97.2	2.0	2.0	76.3	108.3
Canada	CAN	85.5	86.9	93.7	70.1	73.4	39.8	10.0	0.0	-13.1	0.0	31.2	0.7	64.7	1.4	75.0	0.0	2.0	2.8	89.6
Chile	CHL	50.4	65.7	81.7	30.1	43.2	27.8	49.1	0.7	-6.9	38.9	16.4	0.4	88.1	10.3	25.0	2.0	0.0	86.5	84.2
Colombia	COL	-28.1	32.1	17.2	26.2	-5.7	32.8	36.5	1.6	-6.4	32.9	6.4	0.6	42.1	14.1	98.6	1.1	0.0	55.4	87.0
Costa Rica	CRI	28.7	38.9	31.3	33.2	72.0	34.6	11.1	2.1	-5.2	31.6	15.4	0.7	73.4	1.4	100.0	2.0	2.0	95.2	100.5
Croatia	HRV	41.6	22.1	3.3	43.7	-5.4	25.4	14.1	2.6	-10.8	47.9	62.1	0.8	68.4	1.1	100.0	2.0	1.2	82.8	106.8
Cyprus	CYP	54.6	52.9	57.9	41.0	59.2	8.3	23.7	1.2	-2.5	25.0	70.4	0.6	91.3	0.0	100.0	2.0	2.0	94.1	84.3
Czech Republic	CZE	39.1	40.9	52.7	49.7	60.1	17.6	25.4	2.9	-7.0	40.3	45.5	0.7	75.6	1.4	100.0	1.5	1.0	69.3	101.1
Denmark	DNK	94.0	96.1	96.9	61.4	87.7	65.7	37.2	2.4	-1.6	56.9	74.3	0.8	85.2	5.4	75.0	2.0	2.0	31.7	96.8
Estonia	EST	40.9	53.5	41.6	33.6	64.0	26.1	43.8	2.2	-5.6	1.7	29.3	0.6	65.4	2.2	100.0	2.0	2.0	61.6	77.9
Finland	FIN	91.0	97.2	98.8	51.8	79.9	75.8	43.5	2.6	-3.4	68.1	75.9	0.7	66.8	1.4	50.0	2.0	2.0	45.7	103.7
France	FRA	61.0	61.5	67.0	51.7	64.8	25.6	13.2	0.0	-19.4	25.0	8.8	0.5	64.4	4.1	50.0	2.0	1.0	68.2	85.6
Germany	DEU	80.3	70.5	91.3	51.6	72.6	58.0	21.2	2.4	-3.3	75.0	26.3	0.8	79.5	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	36.5	92.5
Greece	GRC	40.6	36.6	61.5	68.8	36.3	11.1	4.6	1.7	-7.1	75.0	29.5	0.4	77.0	0.0	50.0	2.0	2.0	94.3	110.0
Hungary	HUN	49.3	45.2	55.9	19.4	52.4	15.3	14.8	0.9	-11.5	25.0	29.5	0.4	67.8	6.2	100.0	2.0	2.0	70.9	91.9
Iceland	ISL	86.5	87.7	91.1	53.9	87.9	49.0	26.1	2.1	-2.0	52.4	88.9	0.7	86.1	0.0	75.0	2.0	2.0	56.6	101.5
India	IND	36.2	26.5	49.2	40.7	26.8	12.9	39.7	0.0	-7.7	26.4	10.6	0.7	58.8	15.5	50.0	0.0	0.0	29.8	105.4
Ireland	IRL	84.5	80.4	86.0	39.3	69.8	25.7	17.9	1.4	-5.3	94.4	43.4	0.7	66.0	17.0	100.0	2.0	2.0	72.0	104.9
Israel	ISR	58.2	64.3	69.6	36.6	37.4	17.2	60.2	4.3	-2.2	25.0	24.8	0.8	71.5	1.1	50.0	2.0	2.0	81.6	108.2
Italy	ITA	48.2	36.8	56.3	42.2	57.4	19.7	50.7	1.0	-8.4	69.4	36.0	0.5	84.3	31.0	75.0	1.0	1.0	67.5	104.4
Japan	JPN	61.0	57.0	87.6	40.5	66.7	11.5	25.8	1.2	-10.0	62.5	22.0	0.6	61.7	0.0	50.0	2.0	1.0	29.3	99.8

country	code	equality before law	governing capacity	property rights	non-conv participation	freedom of press	women representation	eff number of parl parties	proportionality (district)	disproportionality (Gallagher index)	wage coordination	union density	equality of participation	turnout	referendums/direct democracy	judicial review	unitary (no territorial division)	single chamber (no bicameralism)	fiscal centralization	inclusion
Lithuania	LTU	38.1	29.1	12.1	39.4	63.1	23.4	27.5	1.7	-10.0	1.4	13.5	0.5	58.1	7.3	100.0	2.0	2.0	65.8	91.5
Luxembourg	LUX	84.4	77.5	89.5	75.5	83.3	38.9	28.4	2.7	-4.1	27.8	43.4	0.3	88.8	1.4	50.0	2.0	2.0	81.1	67.3
Malta	MLT	62.2	54.2	59.5	34.7	57.9	10.5	0.5	1.6	-1.5	0.0	64.5	0.7	96.1	1.4	100.0	2.0	2.0	99.3	99.9
Mexico	MEX	12.0	33.0	31.4	41.1	4.3	26.4	9.3	2.9	-5.4	63.3	21.0	0.7	59.1	0.0	75.0	0.0	0.0	54.0	91.5
Netherlands	NLD	89.1	85.4	84.7	109.6	73.1	58.7	40.5	4.6	-1.1	75.0	23.3	0.8	78.3	1.4	0.0	2.0	1.0	69.0	96.4
New Zealand	NZL	88.3	93.3	89.8	85.9	86.0	42.1	14.3	2.5	-7.6	6.9	26.9	0.8	83.5	10.5	25.0	2.0	2.0	84.4	93.7
Norway	NOR	87.3	84.8	93.3	57.5	84.4	80.8	36.1	2.3	-3.4	81.9	55.9	0.7	76.8	1.4	75.0	2.0	1.0	57.5	98.3
Peru	PER	7.1	22.1	6.3	32.3	-8.3	24.9	29.5	2.7	-5.8	21.8	6.6	0.7	76.8	0.4	75.0	2.0	1.0	77.9	91.1
Philippines	PHL	-1.6	27.3	34.6	22.9	29.1	21.8	15.4	0.0	-6.2	21.0	17.0	0.8	68.3	3.5	75.0	1.0	0.0	89.1	83.4
Poland	POL	40.9	33.1	32.5	19.8	47.9	22.6	39.5	2.7	-9.4	0.0	32.0	0.3	47.3	6.2	50.0	2.0	1.0	67.0	102.0
Portugal	PRT	58.8	51.5	67.5	15.7	70.2	24.4	7.3	2.4	-5.3	50.0	21.3	0.6	64.5	2.2	100.0	2.0	2.0	84.5	112.9
Romania	ROU	25.0	23.4	0.4	18.2	15.6	13.8	26.0	1.9	-5.8	36.0	51.7	0.5	69.0	9.2	75.0	2.0	1.2	75.6	100.9
Slovakia	SVK	38.8	34.6	28.4	48.9	29.7	27.9	40.6	3.3	-5.8	59.7	38.8	0.8	77.6	10.0	100.0	1.5	1.8	86.0	99.1
Slovenia	SVN	58.4	40.9	39.8	30.7	56.4	22.9	53.9	2.4	-3.7	66.7	40.0	0.4	72.6	2.7	50.0	2.0	2.0	80.3	101.3
South Africa	ZAF	27.6	42.2	23.5	26.8	37.5	39.6	2.8	3.3	-0.3	49.8	35.3	0.5	83.0	0.0	100.0	1.3	0.0	57.1	72.1
South Korea	KOR	36.2	42.1	78.8	46.2	47.8	9.7	11.1	2.0	-10.2	58.0	12.1	0.4	63.2	0.0	100.0	2.0	2.0	56.4	100.3
Spain	ESP	56.7	57.3	67.0	21.9	67.8	46.8	9.6	1.9	-6.2	58.3	15.8	0.6	74.9	1.4	25.0	1.0	1.0	49.9	104.0
Sweden	SWE	87.4	84.3	79.2	85.7	82.9	81.3	29.3	2.5	-1.8	56.9	79.6	0.8	83.4	2.7	50.0	2.0	2.0	43.8	96.1
Switzerland	CHE	79.0	85.7	90.6	58.8	81.8	36.6	51.2	2.2	-3.2	58.3	21.3	0.1	45.0	80.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.4	83.4
Thailand	THA	24.4	35.1	69.7	40.3	17.7	8.5	34.4	2.9	-11.1	46.3	3.2	0.8	67.4	6.3	75.0	2.0	1.0	87.5	99.1
Turkey	TUR	25.3	34.3	58.6	8.2	-29.2	5.3	19.5	1.9	-18.1	73.1	12.8	0.8	83.5	0.0	50.0	2.0	2.0	12.4	94.1
United Kingdom	GBR	87.1	77.6	80.5	59.2	59.9	29.5	3.9	0.0	-15.8	0.0	31.9	0.7	67.5	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	73.6	96.9
United States	USA	78.0	74.0	85.9	80.5	78.5	23.8	0.4	0.0	-3.5	0.0	13.5	0.7	59.4	0.0	75.0	0.0	0.0	22.3	72.9
Venezuela	VEN	-16.0	16.0	10.3	41.5	8.3	19.7	26.1	1.9	-7.2	41.0	16.4	0.4	48.6	14.6	100.0	0.0	0.6	97.5	85.6
Overall mean		51.3	54.1	59.1	45.6	51.4	30.8	27.3	2.0	-6.6	43.1	33.4	0.6	72.5	5.9	69.4	1.4	1.3	62.5	94.9

shaded: imputed values

Appendix 3: correlations between the 19 indicators

	equality before law	governing capacity	property rights	non-conv participation	freedom of press	women representation	eff number of parl parties	proportionality (district magnitude)	disproportionality (Gallagher index)	wage coordination	union density	equality of participation	turnout	referendums/direct democracy	judicial review	unitary (no territorial division)	single chamber (no bicameralism)	fiscal centralization	inclusion	
equality before law	1.00																			
governing capacity	0.90	1.00																		
property rights	0.84	0.88	1.00																	
non-conv participation	0.62	0.64	0.57	1.00																
freedom of press	0.82	0.79	0.72	0.56	1.00															
women representation	0.55	0.66	0.45	0.47	0.54	1.00														
eff number of parl parties	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.08	1.00													
proportionality (district magnitude)	-0.04	-0.03	-0.13	0.06	-0.10	0.25	0.33	1.00												
disproportionality (Gallagher index)	0.20	0.25	0.11	0.22	0.32	0.42	0.27	0.49	1.00											
wage coordination	0.13	0.11	0.24	0.08	0.02	0.31	0.28	0.38	0.26	1.00										
union density	0.46	0.38	0.21	0.22	0.38	0.46	0.11	0.17	0.44	0.21	1.00									
equality of participation	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.15	-0.02	0.26	-0.26	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.15	1.00								
turnout	0.37	0.30	0.31	0.25	0.27	0.20	0.04	0.11	0.26	0.20	0.47	0.32	1.00							
referendums/direct democracy	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.05	-0.06	0.33	-0.05	0.07	0.12	-0.14	-0.47	-0.34	1.00						
judicial review	-0.37	-0.39	-0.41	-0.34	-0.19	-0.24	-0.24	-0.05	0.07	-0.10	0.10	0.17	-0.01	-0.26	1.00					
unitary (no territorial division)	0.14	0.04	-0.02	-0.16	0.03	-0.01	-0.12	0.23	-0.06	-0.06	0.25	0.04	0.15	-0.32	0.00	1.00				
single chamber (no bicameralism)	0.33	0.19	0.16	0.01	0.23	0.06	-0.15	0.17	-0.06	-0.05	0.40	0.09	0.22	-0.31	0.05	0.66	1.00			
fiscal centralization	-0.25	-0.34	-0.35	-0.16	-0.14	-0.26	-0.06	0.18	0.13	-0.14	0.05	-0.02	0.15	-0.21	0.20	0.51	0.27	1.00		
inclusion	0.01	-0.17	-0.07	-0.21	-0.09	-0.07	0.07	0.21	-0.07	0.32	0.18	0.22	-0.03	-0.08	-0.01	0.27	0.35	0.15	1.00	

Appendix 4: Factor analyses for specific indices

a) Government capacity

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
publser	0.86	0.26
govdec	0.83	0.31
bureau	0.74	0.45
bribcorr	0.96	0.08
cpi	0.95	0.10
transp	0.69	0.52
EW	4.28	

b) Nonconventional political participation

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
memhuman	0.63	0.61
memenviron	0.64	0.59
par_eqpa3	0.62	0.61
petitions	0.64	0.59
EW	1.60	