

# DEMOCRACY BAROMETER

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zda  
Zentrum für  
Demokratie  
Aarau

WZB

nccr  
democracy

FNSNF

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## METHODOLOGY

Core Set (Blueprint) and Extended Sample

Data for 70 countries from 1990 to 2014

Version 5

April, 2016

## Notes

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**(3) Please have a look at the extensive Codebook for a description of all indicators at [www.democracybarometer.org](http://www.democracybarometer.org).**

**(4) Visit us on:**

<http://www.democracybarometer.org>

<http://www.zdaarau.ch>

<http://www.wzb.eu>

<http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch>

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# 1 Introduction


Based on our theoretical concept of democracy, it is feasible to measure a country's quality of democracy for a given point in time. Nevertheless, the quality of the whole endeavor is not only the result of an adequate theoretical concept but equally depends on the quality of the measurement itself (Bollen 1990). As Blalock (1982: 31) puts it: "If either process [conceptualization or measurement] lags too far behind the other, we shall find ourselves stymied."

Using Munck and Verkuilen (2002) as a starting point, there are three critical tasks to accomplish: (1) Appropriate indicators have to be collected. (2) The scaling of the indicators as well as the (sub)components, functions, and principles needs to be determined carefully, especially when it comes to the identification of the lowest and highest possible values. (3) The aggregation of values from each level of the concept tree to the next higher level should be in line with the theoretical assumptions of the concept. Obviously, all those tasks are related to the core concepts of measurement theory: validity and reliability. As other studies show (e.g. Bollen 1990; Bollen and Paxton 1998; Elkins 2000; Coppedge et al. 2008; Treier and Jackman 2008), both have rarely been assigned high importance in contemporary approaches to democracy measurement. The Democracy Barometer project aims at providing not only a sound and transparent theoretical concept but also a convincing measurement strategy.

## 2 Selection of Indicators

Overall, about 300 indicators were collected from existing datasets as well as produced or calculated by the project team on the basis of various types of documents and information. From this collection 105 indicators were selected to build the Democracy Barometer. The indicators constitute the lowest level of a concept tree that mirrors the theoretical framework of the Democracy Barometer, i.e. the stepwise deduction of principles, components, subcomponents, and indicators (see figure 1 and the paper on the theoretical framework on [democracybarometer.org](http://democracybarometer.org)).

Figure 1: Concept tree of the Democracy Barometer (schematically)



The selection of the indicators as well as their assignment to subcomponents was basically theory-driven to ensure content validity and to prevent concept overstretching as described by Sartori (1970). The necessary reduction from 300 to 105 was structured by the following guidelines:

1. The Democracy Barometer tries not to rely too heavily on data produced by expert judgments. As Bollen and Paxton (1998, 2000) or Steenbergen and Marks (2007) have pointed out, the reliability of expert ratings is sometimes questionable. In lieu of or in addition to expert judgments, the Democracy Barometer uses – whenever possible – ‘hard’ data and aggregated survey data. That is a decisive difference to other democracy indices such as Freedom House (FH), the Polity Project or the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which are all more or less purely based on expert judgments.
2. Measurement errors pose a serious problem, though to a certain degree they are inevitable (Zeller and Carmines 1980). However, some approaches may help to scale down the amount of measurement errors. On the one hand, data was collected from a wide variety of sources. This should reduce the amount of systematic error. On the other hand, to minimize random error, subcomponents are composed – if data availability allows for it – of two different indicators which capture similar concepts, but do so in a different fashion or originate from different sources. Studies on democracy measurement have shown that these are very effective strategies to increase the measurement quality (Bollen 1993; Munck and Verkullen 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2008).
3. The focus on the mere existence of democratic institutions is one of the major shortcomings of existing indices. This is even more problematic if a project aims at measuring the quality of democracy. Therefore, the Democracy Barometer takes into account both a country’s institutional setting (rules in law) as well as the effectiveness of those institutions in practice (rules in use). Each component consists of at least one subcomponent that measures rules in law and one that measures rules in use.
4. Last, but not least, the chosen indicators have to fulfill a more pragmatic condition: they should be available at least for all countries and all years in our blueprint-sample (see below) and – if possible – also for further countries and years. Using different sources for one and the same indicator but different countries or points in time poses a serious threat to measurement quality. Such a strategy would only be feasible if the measurement and the content validity of the indicator is identical for all sources of information. These conditions are rather seldom fulfilled.

As mentioned above, 105 indicators meet these necessary criteria. They are used to calculate the values of 53 subcomponents, which again constitute 18 components, two for each of the nine functions. Precise information about all these indicators can be found in the codebook. Below you will find a more detailed overview for each function (appendix 1).

### 3 Scaling

In order to aggregate the indicators to subcomponents and further levels of the concept tree, they need to have the same scales. This, however, is not a straightforward task. Scaling is crucial for the quality of a measurement instrument. It is not only important to choose between dichotomous, ordinal, or metric scales but also to identify appropriate minimum and maximum values of an index. For example, as Elkins (2000) points out the choice between a dichotomous or continuous scale for democracy has a substantive impact not only on the degree of measurement error but also on the causal relationships with other indicators.<sup>1</sup>

In general, three different rules could be applied to define the extremes of a scale for a measurement instrument like the Democracy Barometer and its elements:

1. The scaling could be based on theory-driven decisions. In other words, we could define theoretical minimum and maximum values for each indicator. However and as stated in our conceptual paper, there is no universal theory of democracy. Therefore, no such thresholds can be identified. For instance, whereas the Schumpeterian democratic theory would not assume a very low electoral turnout to be particularly problematic, participatory democracy would plea for a much higher threshold.<sup>2</sup>
2. Another option is to scale our indicators according to impartial and globally accepted standards. For the quality of democracy one might think of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a reference. Unfortunately, only a very small number of the relevant 100 indicators could be rescaled on such a basis. This makes this second rule inappropriate for our project.
3. The third possibility is based on the ideal of empirical minima and maxima. For each indicator, or whenever necessary on a higher stage of aggregation, the best and worst practice in established democracies can be identified. Hence, for each indicator, the lowest value is recoded into 0 while the highest value receives the new value 100. All other values are assigned in relation to these two references.

The Democracy Barometer project has opted for the third rule to produce adequate scales. To accomplish this task, a set of 'blueprint' countries, i.e., established democracies, was identified, against which all other countries (i.e. country-years) can be compared. The selection of blueprint countries is tremendously important. To prevent any bias while determining best and worst practices, it must be ensured that every established democracy in the world is included.<sup>3</sup> For the definition of such a 'universe of established democracies' we rely on existing indices of democracy, which are useful to distinguish between democracies and autocracies, or between democracies and

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<sup>1</sup> Freedom House provides an example: The Civil Liberties Index and the Political Rights Index both have a categorical scale from 1 to 7, despite the fact that they are originally based on quasi-continuous scales from 0-40 and 0-60 respectively. The consequences of the widely used scales from 1 to 7 instead of the underlying quasi-continuous scales are very substantive. For example, the rescaling leads to an artificial reduction of variance. In 2008, 57 countries were assigned the highest possible value for Political Rights. This group includes a wide range of countries like Sweden, Estonia, Ghana and Israel. It must be noted that Freedom House does not provide the data for those quasi-continuous scales before 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Two further examples shall show the difficulties of this approach: What is the optimal number of parties? How many strikes per year are too much for a high quality of democracy? One could argue that such problems could be solved if only the existence of institutions was measured. It is relatively easy to apply theoretical minima and maxima when the question is whether a necessary institution is established (1) or not (0). However, we argue that the quality of a democracy should comprise more than only a sound institutional setting. Of course, we invite the research community to use our indicators in an alternative manner.

<sup>3</sup> As there is no such thing as the specific democratic model but a universe of different types of democracies, such a strategy prevents distortions due to selection bias.

*established* democracies in our case. More specifically, we have based our country selection on exogenous sources: the Polity and Freedom House Index. A country is included into the blueprint sample if it is described as highly democratic over a substantive period of time. Thus, it needs to have a value of 1.5 or below on the combined Freedom House Scores *and* a Polity IV Score of 9 or above during the whole time span between 1995 and 2005.<sup>4</sup> Thus, a country qualifies as an established democracy (and as a result as a blueprint country) if it is a stable and highly developed (at least between 1995 and 2005) democracy. Additionally and due to problems of data availability, we have limited our selection to countries with more than 250,000 inhabitants.<sup>5</sup>

All in all, 34 countries meet these criteria. However, four countries, namely the Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde and Mauritius, had to be excluded due to the high proportion of missing data. Our blueprint sample thus includes the following 30 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (see appendix 2 for more details). Hence, the blueprint sample consists of 330 country-years (30 countries multiplied by eleven years analyzed)

Following the 'best/worst-practice' scaling option, all indicators were standardized in accordance with the following procedure: the lowest empirical value within the blueprint sample (330 country-years) was rescaled to 0 and the highest empirical value was rescaled to 100.

We argue that 'best/worst-practice' is most appropriate for our endeavor for at least three reasons:

- We define democracy as a political system that continuously redefines and alters itself, depending on ongoing political as well as societal deliberation (Beetham, 2004). Consequently, each given democracy weights the principles and functions differently. What we should measure is therefore the actually existing maximum, i.e. best practice for each function. This is a great advantage compared to other longitudinal data. With a defined and fixed maximum developments and progress cannot be appropriately measured. Contrarily, the best practice measurement is flexible concerning its minimum and its maximum.<sup>6</sup>
- The Democracy Barometer was applied to a bigger country sample and the period of study was extended to cover the time-span between 1990 and 2014. In addition to the 30 blueprint countries, data was collected for 40 additional countries: Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Israel, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The values of these additional countries were standardized in relation to the best and to worst practice of the blueprint countries. This has led to values below 0 and

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<sup>4</sup> There is a pragmatic as well as a theoretical reason for the choice of this time span. First, data availability increases significantly after 1995. Second, to avoid a Western bias, we also wanted to include still relatively new but nevertheless established democracies (foremost Eastern European countries). However, in most of these countries democratization took place in the mid-1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

<sup>5</sup> Although not an ideal solution, other projects have shown that this is a feasible strategy (e.g. Lijphart 1999).

<sup>6</sup> Thus, the Democracy Barometer can be enlarged and improved with new and better indicators (indeed, the market of good indicators grows). In this case, best and worst practice can be quite easily re-calibrated. We invite the research community to enhance the quality of our measure by providing us with new indicators that meet the necessary conditions described above and that are available for all countries in our sample (also see [www.democracybarometer.org](http://www.democracybarometer.org)).

above 100, which might seem problematic at first sight but this is not the case. To the contrary: values below 0 simply indicate a democratic performance that is poorer than the poorest performance within the blueprint sample with regard to the respective indicator, (sub)component, function etc., while values above 100 indicate a better performance. The aim of the Democracy Barometer is not to define whether a country is a democracy or not but to compare the quality of different established democracies. The relative scale without fixed minima and maxima makes the Democracy Barometer a very powerful tool for time series and large-N studies.<sup>7</sup>

- Another important aim of the project is the comparison of different types of established democracies. Best practice is most appropriate for this purpose (Beetham 2004) because it allows us to analyze different trade-offs between principles or functions. Thus, we can analyze empirically existing varieties of democracy.

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<sup>7</sup> We provide interested researchers with the raw (unstandardized indicators) as well as the standardized data (standardized indicators, subcomponents, components, functions, principles and overall quality score; see [www.democracybarometer.org](http://www.democracybarometer.org)). Hence, we explicitly invite the research community to try other scaling and aggregation procedures.



## 4 Aggregation

### 4.1 General Remarks

The conceptualization of the Democracy Barometer with its different levels of abstraction further requires the definition of aggregation rules. How should the indicators be aggregated to subcomponents, components, functions, principles and, in the end, to an overall index of democratic quality? Moreover, are all elements on the same level equally important? To ensure adequate measurement, we adopt a procedure that at best mirrors our conceptual idea. We proceed stepwise up the concept tree from indicators back to subcomponents, components, functions and principles to the overall index of the quality of democracy.

The level of principles defines necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy. If the three principles are realized the respective polity is a democracy. The same applies to the level of functions. They are theoretically deducted as functional pre-requisites. However, since we assume for theoretical reasons, that blueprints of democracy vary, we assume that different types of democracy promote different functions primarily. A democracy oriented toward majority representation and government will put emphasis on functions different to a democracy oriented toward proportional representation, for example. However, only those polities are regarded as democratic, which fulfil *all* functions at a democratic minimum. Above this minimum, everything is a matter of degree. Thus, we assume that the quality of democracy differs between democratic countries.

For measuring variation in the quality of democracy properly, the relationships between principles, functions, components, and sub-components have to be translated into aggregation rules, which fit the hierarchical concept of our theory. The core points and propositions of our concept are the following:

1. Our concept underlies the assumption of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a member of the category democracy;
2. We assume variation in the quality of democracy between polities, resulting from different balances between elements of democratic quality;
3. In general, we assume that elements of the concept tree each have equal weight within their group.
4. Partial compensation can be at work. This is in line with the theoretical consideration that different types of democracy show different balances between principles or functions, or even trade-offs.
5. We do not only claim that the quality of democracy can differ, once the (minimum) level of established democracies is reached. We also claim that there are different levels of non-democracy, from autocratic to slightly defective democracies, i.e. polities, which almost reach the quality of established democracies, but not fully.
6. Thus, the compensation rule claimed within the group of established democracies extends to combinations of lower qualities.

## 4.2 Possible Performance Variations

To define the appropriate aggregation rules is not as easy as one might think when talking about necessary condition and sufficient conditions, of compensation in contrast to substitution, and extending the measure beyond full democracies. The traditional way to deal with necessary and sufficient condition is to apply what is known from set theory (QCA). For the respective project here, this approach is only helpful concerning the definition of membership in the group of established democracies.

Applying necessary and sufficient condition implies in set theory applying AND, i.e. the minimum, in case of necessary condition. Since we will go beyond established democracies, and because we want to measure degrees of democratic qualities even in not fully-fledged democracies, necessary and sufficient condition rules can only be applied to define "membership" in the group of our blueprint-democracies.

Remember the argument of different emphasis on functions of different types of democracy. We assume that a kind of balancing takes place between functions, not substitution. A polity which performs very well on function x but poor on the function y would – according to the set theoretical approach of family resemblance – receive the maximum score realized, i.e. the score of x. In contrast to substitution, balancing implies that there are costs, which can only be compensated partly. However, the assumption that partial compensation is possible, which implies that the AND-condition from set theory, i.e. the minimum, could also not been applied. This has to be taken into account in the aggregation rule.

## 4.3 Basic Assumptions

Our aggregation rule is based on the following six basic assumptions:

1. Equilibrium is regarded as a positive feature. It indicates that (at a certain level), the elements of quality of democracy are in balance. Because the assumption of the underlying theory is that the best democracy is one, in which all its elements show a maximum performance and the worst is one where all its elements show a minimum of performance, this is justified.
2. Since we deal in the framework of the "blue print countries" with established democracies, we cannot apply the simple and strict rule of necessary condition. Instead, a modification, which allows for compensation of poor quality in one element by better quality in another element, is introduced.
3. Compensation, however, cannot result in full compensation (substitutability). The larger the disequilibrium, the smaller is the compensation. Thus, disequilibrium has to be punished relative to equilibrium.
4. Equal degrees of disequilibrium should be punished equally, larger disequilibrium more than smaller disequilibrium. This implies progressive discount the larger the disequilibrium.

Furthermore, our theoretical consideration about compensation suggests having "costs" implied if quality measurements are not in equilibrium. In other words, a democracy is the better the more quality elements score *evenly* high. The more deviation there is between qualities of elements, the more declining the score. This implies that the measure accounts for discordance, i.e. the higher it is, the lower weight should the better performance in one spatial dimension have.

#### 4.4 Aggregation procedure

As mentioned in section 3, to aggregate the indicators and subcomponents we standardized all indicators according to the “best/worst-practice” based on our blueprint sample from 1995 to 2005 (330 country-years). However, our measure of the quality of democracy should also apply to countries, which are not yet or not anymore established democracies. Hence, the Democracy Barometer is also applied to an extended sample that covers the time-span between 1990 and 2014 where we may encounter values below 0 and above 100. We therefore decided to add the value +500 to each of our indicators during the aggregation process to deal with zeroes and negative values and subtract the same value from the final score after the aggregation.

Therefore, the formula reads as follows:<sup>8</sup>

$$DB = \left[ \prod_{i=1}^n (X_i + 500) \right]^{1/n} - 500$$

The Democracy Barometer is a complex measure, which starts from indicators, subcomponents, components, functions, principles, and finally the overall-score (see figure 1, page 3). Except for the sub-components composed of indicators and the components composed of the subcomponents of which we cannot postulate necessary and sufficient conditions, the aggregation rule must be applied on every stage of aggregation. Thus, we apply the following aggregation procedure stepwise (see Figure 2):

1. As discussed above, all indicators are first standardized to a 0 (worst practice in blueprint sample) to 100 (best practice in blueprint sample) scale.
2. The first level of aggregation – from indicators to subcomponents – is based on arithmetic means of the standardized indicators. The ‘simple’ average of the indicators corresponds to the idea that the indicators within a subcomponent must measure the same phenomenon and that they can thus compensate each other.
3. The same procedure and the same underlying idea are adopted for the second step of aggregation from subcomponents to components: thus, the components are the means of the subcomponents.
4. Functions are measured by applying the aggregation formula specified above to components.
5. Principles are measured by applying the aggregation formula specified above to functions.
6. Democratic quality is measured by applying the aggregation formula specified above to principles.


The Democracy Barometer provides scholars with access to both the standardized the full dataset and the non-standardized raw dataset and therefore many opportunities to create other indices if they like. It is for example possible to measure an entirely different concept of democracy with the data at hand. Researchers supporting a more minimalist concept might consider the functions ‘Competition’, ‘Individual Liberties’ and ‘Participation’ as more important than the other six functions. Others might want to set other aggregation rules. The scientific

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<sup>8</sup> See Bühlmann et al. (2013) for another aggregation rule that accounts also for diminishing marginal returns in the increase of democratic quality.

community is explicitly encouraged to test different ways of scaling, aggregating and/or weighting. Of course, researchers should always make sure to theoretically justify their choices.

Figure 2: Stepwise aggregation (schematically)



## Appendix 1: Overview

The following pages give a short overview of the functions (concept tree, indicators). Additionally, tables with first results were presented. For detailed information about the indicators and their sources, please refer to the codebook (available at [www.democracybarometer.org](http://www.democracybarometer.org)).

The colors in the conceptual trees have the following meanings:

dark blue: Overall quality of democracy score (QOD)

mint: principles

light blue: functions


yellow: components

orange: subcomponents measuring effective impact (rules in use)

pink: subcomponents measuring constitutional settings (rules in law)


green: indicators

# 1 OVERALL QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY, PRINCIPLES, FUNCTIONS - CONCEPT TREE



## 2 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES

### 2.1 Concept Tree




## 2.2 Individual Liberties: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Right to physical integrity	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity	Consttort	Existence of constitutional provisions banning torture or inhumane treatment. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	CON, DAP, ECPHRFF, IAPPT, ACHPR, ACHR, C TOCIDTP
		Convort	Ratification of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.	HDR
	No transgressions by the state	Politerr	Political Terror Scale; degree of political terror by government.	PTS
		Torture	Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.	CIRI
	Mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens	Homicide	Number of homicides per 100'000 capita (multiplied with -1).	EUROSTAT, UNODC, WB, WHO, Wikipedia
		Riot	Number of violent demonstrations or clashes of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (multiplied with -1).	BCNTS
Right to free conduct of life	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing right to freedom of conduct of life	Constrel	Existence of constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	CON, DAP, ECPHRFF, ICCPR, ACHPR, ACHR
		Constfreemov	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	CON, ECPHRFF, ICCPR, UNUDHR
	Freedom of conduct of life	Freerelig	Extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. 0 = Yes, there are severe restrictions on religious practices by the government; 1 = restrictions are moderate. 2 = there are no restrictions	CIRI
		Freemove	Citizens' freedom to travel within their own country and to leave and return to that country. 0 = freedom of movement is severely restricted; 0.5 = intermediate category; 1 = freedom of movement is somewhat restricted; 1.5 = intermediate category; 2 = freedom of movement is unrestricted.	CIRI
	Effective property rights	Propright	Measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws.	IEF
		Secprop	Personal security and private property are adequately protected.	IMD, WGI



### 3 RULE OF LAW

#### 3.1 Concept Tree




### 3.2 Rule of Law: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Equality before the law	Constitutional provisions for impartial courts	Constfair	Constitutional provisions for fair organization of the court system (no exceptional courts and hierarchical judicial system).	DAP
		Pubtrial	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public trial.	DAP
	Effective independence of the judiciary	Judindepcor	Level of independence of the judiciary (no inside corruption or outside influence).	DAP
		Judindepinf	Level of independence of the judiciary from political influences of members of government, citizens, or firms.	GCR
	Effective impartiality of the legal system	Impcourts	Legal framework is not inefficient and subject to manipulation.	GCR, WGI
Intgrlegal		Integrity of the legal system.	EFWP	
Quality of the legal system	Constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism	Profjudg	Professionalism (law degree, professional experience) is a precondition for appointment of judges to highest courts.	Kritzer et al.
		Proftenure	Professionalism of judges concerning length of tenure. Professionalism is high, if tenure is not constricted, i.e. it is lifelong.	Kritzer et al.
	Confidence in the justice system	Confjust	Share of citizens with confidence in the legal system.	AfB, AsB, AsnB, EB, ESS, ISS, LAPOP, LB, WVS
		Fairjust	Assessment of the confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society.	IMD, WGI
	Confidence in the police	Confpolice	Share of citizens with confidence in the police.	AfB, AsB, AsnB, EB, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS
		Fairpolice	Assessment of reliability/effectiveness of the police services	GCR

## 4 PUBLIC SPHERE

### 4.1 Concept Tree




## 4.2 Public Sphere: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Freedom to associate	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom to associate	Constfras	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of association. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF.
		Constass	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of assembly. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF.
	Degree of association (economic interests)	Union	Trade union density.	Visser (2011), GURN, ILO, Eurofund, Blanchflower (2006), Golden&Wallerstein (2006), McGuire, Lora / Pagés-Serra
		Memproorg	Membership in professional organizations (share of respondents).	AfB, EB, ESS, CSES, WVS.
	Degree of association (public interests)	Memhuman	Membership in humanitarian organizations (share of respondents).	WVS, ISS
		Memenviron	Membership in environmental/animal rights organizations (share of respondents).	WVS, EB, ESS, LB
Freedom of opinion	Freedom of speech	Constspeech	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF.
		Constpress	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of press. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.	DAP, CON, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF.
	Media offer	Newsimp	Import of newspapers, journals and periodicals as a % of GDP.	CD, WB
		Newspaper	Number of daily newspapers per 1 million inhabitants.	WPT, WB
	Political neutrality of press system	Balpress	Ideological balance of the press system.	Blum (2005), BPHW, HBI, Kelly et al. (2004), MT, Østergaard (1992), Voltmer (2000), WP, Wikipedia.

		Neutrp	Share of neutral / independent newspapers' circulation.	Blum (2005), BPHW, HBI, Kelly et al. (2004), MT, Østergaard (1992), Vltmer (2000), WP, Wikipedia.
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# 5 Competition

## 5.1 Concept Tree



## 5.2 Competition: Description of Indicators


Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Vulnerability (Competitiveness of elections)	Formal rules for competitiveness	Meandistrict	Mean district magnitude	DPI; IPU; ACE; Katz 2001; 2006; Nohlen et al. 1999; 2001; Nohlen 2004; 2005.
		Gerryman	Possibilities to delimit electoral districts; categories: 3 = no possibility; 2 = body responsible for drawing the boundaries is NOT executive or legislative; 1 = legislative is responsible for drawing the boundaries; 0 = executive is responsible for drawing the boundaries.	ACE
	Closeness of electoral out- comes	Largpavo	Margin of electoral concentration of votes; $Comp = 100\% - p_{strongest}$ , where $p_{strongest}$ = percentage of votes obtained by strongest party.	WZB, Nohlen et al. 2001, Nohlen et al. 1995.
		Votediff	100-Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all votes.	WZB, Nohlen et al. 2001, Nohlen et al. 1995.
	Low concentra- tion of seats	Herfindex	Herfindahl index: the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in parliament. Measures the degree of concentration (multiplied with -1).	DPI
		Seatdiff	100-Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all seats.	WZB, Nohlen et al. 2001.
	Contestability (Openness of elections)	Low legal hurdles for entry	Adminhurd	Low administrative hurdles to become a competitor.
Eff_tresh			Effective threshold calculated as approximately the midway between the threshold of representation and the threshold of exclusion.	District magnitude: see meandistrict above
Effective contes- tation		Smallpavo	Chance for small parties to win a seat: share of votes of smallest party in national parliament (multiplied with -1).	WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001).
		Enep	Effective number of parties at the electoral level.	WZB, Nohlen et al.

				(2001).
	Effective access to resources	Ceilings	Existence of ceilings on expenditure and income of political parties.	IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.
		Funding	Existence of provisions for direct and indirect public funding of political parties.	IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.



## 6 Mutual Constraints

### 6.1 Concept Tree




## 6.2 Mutual Constraints: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Checks between three powers	Balance of checks between executive and legislative powers	Balexleg	Balance of checks between the executive and the legislative powers as represented by the (reversed) absolute difference (controlex - controle) in the standardized checks available to the legislative (controlex) and the executive (controlle) powers over each other	IAEP, CON
		Balpowexle	Balance of powers (opposition vs. government) according to Altman/Pérez-Liñan 2002.	WZB.
	Judicial review	Seatsgov	100- Proportion of parliamentary seats belonging to governing parties.	WZB.
		Judrev	The extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or constitutional court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country (from 2: full review of constitutionality of laws; 1: limited review of constitutionality; 0 no review.	DAP
		Powjudi	Power of judiciary. Possibility to control political decisions.	Kneipp 2007, Kritzer (2002), La Porta et al. (2003), Rhyne (1978), Ten Brinke/Deml (2002), DAP
Vertical checks of power	Degree of Federalism	Federalism	Federalism index as developed by Geering-Thacker (6 - unitarism); 1 = unitary state; 5 = strong federal state	Gerring/Thacker
		Bicameralism	Bicameralism as defined by Gerring and Thacker	Gerring/Thacker
	Subnational fiscal autonomy	Subexp	Subnational expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures	GFS, WB, OECD, Dexia
		Subrev	Subnational revenues as a percentage of GDP	GFS, WB, OECD

# 7 Governmental Capability

## 7.1 Concept Tree




## 7.2 Governmental Capability: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Government resources	Time horizon for action	Legislen	Length of legislative period (if no given rule in constitution the maximum length is taken).	Con, IPU, Wikipedia
		Govterm	Length of government term.	CIA
	Public support	Confgov	Share of citizens with high confidence in the government.	LB, EB, EES, AfB, AsB, AsnB, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS
		Devbehav	Share of citizens which do not endorse behavior and attitudes that are directed against the democratic society.	WVS
	Governmental stability	Govstab	Stability of government; A cabinet is seen as stable if it is able to stay in government during the whole legislation.	WZB
		Cabchange	Number of major cabinet changes (multiplied with -1).	BCNTS
Conditions for efficient implementation	No anti-government action	Antigovact	Legitimate anti-government action (such as strikes aimed at national government policies or authority or peaceful gatherings for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority; multiplied by -1).	BCNTS
		Violantigov	Illegitimate anti-government action (such as armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime or illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government; multiplied by -1).	BCNTS
	No interference	Mip	No political interference by military.	ICRG
		Rip	No political interference by religion.	ICRG
		Publser	Independence of public service of political interference.	IMD
	Administrative assertiveness	Govdec	Government decisions are effectively implemented.	IMD, WGI
		Bureau	Bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.	ICRG
	Independence of the Central Bank	CenBank_Ind	Assessment of the independence of the central bank (reversed).	Crowe/Meade 2008; Cukierman et al. 1992; Cukierman et al. 2003; Jácome & Vázquez (2005).

# 8 Transparency

## 8.1 Concept Tree




## 8.2 Transparency: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
No secrecy	Disclosure of party financing	Discinco	Existence of provision for disclosure of income by political parties.	IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.
		Discexp	Existence of provision for public disclosure of expenditure by political parties.	IDEA, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto 1998; Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO (2011); Cons; Partylaw.
	Absence of corruption	Bribcorr	Assessment of corruption within the political system.	ICRG
		CPI	Corruption Perception Index, ranging from 0 (high) to 10 (low) and measuring the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the public and political sectors.	TI
	Provisions for transparent political process	Freedom of information	RestricFOI	Restriction of freedom of information / barriers for access to official information.
EffFOI			Effectiveness of Freedom of Information laws.	Banisar (2006), CON, CDA, Tromp (2008)
Informational openness		Legmedia	Examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate.	FH
		Polmedia	Evaluation of the degree of political control over the content of news media.	FH
Willingness for transparent communication		Transp	Assessment of the transparency of government policy.	IMD, FH

# 9 Participation

## 9.1 Concept Tree




## 9.2 Participation: Description of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Equality of participation	Suffrage	Suffrage	Requirements for and disqualifications of active suffrage.	IPU-Chronicles
		Regprovap	Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population.	IDEA-T
	Non-selectivity of electoral participation	Repturned	Representative voter turnout in terms of resources (no participation gap in terms of education and income).	AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB
		Repturngeag	Representative voter turnout in terms of gender and age (no participation gap).	AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB
	Non-selectivity of alternative participation	Repaltined	Representative alternative participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of resources (no participation gap).	AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB
		Repaltgeag	Representative alternative participation (signing petition and attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of gender and age (no participation gap).	AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB
Effective participation	Rules facilitating participation	Facilitat	Facilitation of electoral participation.	ACE; Blais et al. (2007); IDEA-T, EV
		Regist	Voter registration is not compulsory.	ACE, CON, Rosenberg/Chen (2009). OSCE
	Effective institutionalized participation	Meanpart	Mean participation rate in % of registered electorate in legislative election and/or presidential elections (copied to all years) and/or national referenda (calculated into mean in corresponding year).	AED, ANU, IDEA-T, IPU, UCI, USEP
		Eff_DD	Effective use of direct democratic instruments.	c2d
	Effective non-institutionalized participation	Petitions	Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having signed petitions.	AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.



		Demons	Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having attended lawful demonstrations.	AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.
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Representation  
9.3 Concept Tree



#### 9.4 Representation: Descriptive of Indicators

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Substantive representation	Structural possibilities for inclusion of preferences	Seatperin	Number of seats (lower house) per inhabitants.	ACEA, DPI, IPU, UNSTATS
		No_district	Number of districts in lowest tier.	IPU, Golder (2004), PDoA, Electoral statistics
	Constitutional provisions for direct democracy	Dirdem	Existence of constitutional provisions for direct democracy.	Hug/Tsebelis (2001); ACE, C2d; Cons; Electoral laws; Direct Democracy Navigator; Welp/Serdült 2009
		DD_Quora	Existence of constitutional provisions for approval or participation quorum in direct democracy.	Own calculations based on: Kaufmann, ACM, Venice Commission, C2D, Herrera/Mattozzi, Auer/Bützer, Rodrigo Salazar
	No distortion	Gallagindex	Index of proportionality according to Gallagher (vote-seat congruence).	WZB
		Issuecongr	Congruence between left-right positions of voters and left-right positions of parliamentarians (measured by party positions).	Altman et al. (2009), CMP, Coppedge (1997), CSES, EB, EES, ESS, ISS, IPU, LAPOP, LB, PELA, PDoA, Wiesehomeier/Benoit (2009), Wikipedia, WVS.
Descriptive representation	No legal constraints for inclusion of minorities	Polrightwom	Measures women's political rights, including the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials.	CIRI
		Constraints	Measures the existence of constraints regarding passive suffrage and inverses the score.	IPU-Chronicles

		Partban	Ban of ethnic minority parties.	IAEP
Adequate representation of women		Womrep	Proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament in % of all seats.	Armingeon et al. (2010), Vanhanen (2008), IPU.
		Womgov	Proportion of female representatives in the government (incl. ministers)	HDR; UNECE
Effective access to power for minorities		Minrep	Index of descriptive representation of autochthonous ethnic minority groups in the lower chamber of parliament.	MAR, Hänni (2015)
		Minpower	Access to central power by ethnic minority groups.	Cederman et al. (2013)

## Sources:

ACE	ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. <a href="http://aceproject.org">http://aceproject.org</a>
ACEA	Adam Carr's Election Archive. <a href="http://psephos.adma-carr.net">http://psephos.adma-carr.net</a>
ACHPR	African Charter On Human And People's Rights <a href="http://www.achpr.org/english/ratifications/ratification_african%20charter.pdf">http://www.achpr.org/english/ratifications/ratification_african%20charter.pdf</a>
ACHR	American Convention on Human Rights <a href="http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html">http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html</a>
ACM	Aguiar-Conraria, Luís and Magalhães, Pedro C. (2010): Referendum Design, Quorum Rules and Turnout. <i>Public Choice</i> 144, 63-81.
AED	African Election Database. <a href="http://africanelections.tripod.com">http://africanelections.tripod.com</a>
AfB	Afrobarometer. <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">http://www.afrobarometer.org</a>
Altman et al. (2009)	Altman, David, Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro and Sergio Toro (2009). Partidos y sistemas de partidos en América Latina: Aproximaciones desde la encuesta a expertos 2009. <i>Revista de Ciencia Política</i> 29(3): 775-98.
Altman/Perez-Liñan (2002)	Altman, D. and A. Pérez-Liñán (2002). Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries. <i>Democratization</i> 9(2): 85-100.
ANU	Australian National University.

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- AsB** Asiabarometer.  
<https://www.asiabarometer.org>
- AsnB** Asian Barometer  
<http://www.asianbarometer.org/>
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<http://www.databanksinternational.com>
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- Blanchflower (2006)** Blanchflower, David G. (2006). A Cross-Country Study of Union Membership. IZA Discussion Paper No 2016.

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<b>BPHW</b>	Banks' Political Handbooks of the World.
<b>Castillo/Zovatto</b>	Castillo, Pilar del, Zovatto, Daniel (1998). La Financiación de la Política en Iberoamérica. IIDH/CAPEL.
<b>C2D</b>	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy. <a href="http://www.c2d.ch">http://www.c2d.ch</a>
<b>Casas-Zamora (2005)</b>	Casas-Zamora, Kevin (2005). Paying for Democracy: Political finance and state funding for parties. Essex: ECPR press.
<b>CD</b>	Comtrade Database (UN). <a href="http://comtrade.un.org">http://comtrade.un.org</a>
<b>CDA</b>	CentralAmericaData. <a href="http://www.centralamericadata.com/es/article/home/Costa_Rica_y_El_Salvador_sin_Ley_de_Acceso_a_Informacion">http://www.centralamericadata.com/es/article/home/Costa_Rica_y_El_Salvador_sin_Ley_de_Acceso_a_Informacion</a>
<b>CIA</b>	CIA World Factbook.
<b>CIRI</b>	The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. <a href="http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp">http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp</a>
<b>CMP</b>	Comparative Manifestos Project Data Set. <a href="http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/dsl/Projekte/projekte-manifesto.en.htm">http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/dsl/Projekte/projekte-manifesto.en.htm</a>
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe (1998). Prohibition of political parties and analogous measures report. <a href="http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-INF(1998)014-e.asp">http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-INF(1998)014-e.asp</a>

CON	Specific constitution of every country. <a href="http://confinder.richmond.edu">http://confinder.richmond.edu</a>
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Crowe/Meade 2008	Crowe, Christopher, Meade, Ellen E. (2008). Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness. IMF Working Paper.
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. <a href="http://www.cses.org">http://www.cses.org</a>
CTOCIDTP	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  <a href="http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=IV-9&amp;chapter=4&amp;lang=en#7">http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=IV-9&amp;chapter=4&amp;lang=en#7</a>
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DAP	Democracy Assistance Project - Phase II. Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Liñan, Mitchell A. Seligson and C. Neal Tate <a href="http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html">http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html</a>
Direct Democracy Navigator	The Navigator to Direct Democracy <a href="http://direct-democracy-navigator.org">http://direct-democracy-navigator.org</a>



Dexia	Local Governments in the World. Basic Facts on 82 selected countries
DPI	Database of Political Institutions 2009. Thorsten Beck , Philip E. Keefer, George R. Clarke, Thorsten Beck and Philip E. Keefer . Development Research Group. The World Bank. <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2009_corrected_April2010.dta">http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2009_corrected_April2010.dta</a>
EB	Eurobarometer Trend File <a href="http://www.gesis.org/?id=798">http://www.gesis.org/?id=798</a>
ECPHRFF	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
EES	European Election Survey <a href="http://www.ees-homepage.net/">http://www.ees-homepage.net/</a>
EFWP	Economic Freedom of the World Project. Fraser Institute. <a href="http://www.freetheworld.com">http://www.freetheworld.com</a>
Elklit/Reynolds (2002)	Elklit, J. and A. Reynolds (2002). The impact of election administration on the legitimacy of emerging democracies: a new comparative politics research agenda. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40: 86-119.
ESS	European Social Survey. <a href="http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org">http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org</a>
Eurofound	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. <a href="http://www.eurofound.europa.eu">http://www.eurofound.europa.eu</a>
EUROSTAT	European Commission. Eurostat – key to European statistics. <a href="http://epp-eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home">http://epp-eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home</a>
EV	Early Voting. United States.

	<a href="http://www.earlyvoting.net/blog/2010/05/balloting-busy">http://www.earlyvoting.net/blog/2010/05/balloting-busy</a>
<b>FH</b>	Freedom House. Freedom of the Press. <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16">http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16</a>
<b>FI</b>	Freedominfo.org The global network of freedom of information advocates  www.freedominfo.org
<b>GALLAGHER</b>	Election indices ( <a href="http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/E%20Systems/Docs/ElectionIndices.pdf">www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/E!Systems/Docs/ElectionIndices.pdf</a> ); also see: Gallagher, Michael (1991). Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. Comparative Electoral Studies 10(1): 33-51. Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (2008; eds). The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
<b>GCR</b>	Global Competitiveness Report World Economic Forum. <a href="http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm">http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm</a>
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<b>GFS</b>	Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM. International Monetary Fund.
<b>Golden &amp; Wallerstein</b>	Golden, Miriam & Wallerstein, Michael (2006). Union Centralization among advanced Industrial Societies. Update to 1995/2000.
<b>GRECO</b>	Group of Countries against Corruption. Evaluations.  <a href="http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp">http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp</a>
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GURN	Global Union Research Network. <a href="http://www.gurn.info">http://www.gurn.info</a>
Gutierrez/Zovatto	Gutierrez, Pablo, Zovatto, Daniel (2011). Financiamiento de los partidos politicos en America Latina. OAS, IDEA.
HBI	Hans-Bredow-Institut. <a href="http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de">http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de</a>
HDR	Human Development Reports. <a href="http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/indicators_table.cfm">http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/indicators_table.cfm</a>
Herrera/Mattozzi	Herrera, Helios and Mattozzi, Andrea (2010): Quorum and Turnout in Referenda. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> 8(4), 838-871.
HRR	Human Right Reports of the U.S. Departement of State <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt">http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt</a>
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Hug/Tsebelis (2002)	Hug, Simon, Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players and Referendums around the World. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 14(4): 465-515.
IAPPT	Inter-American Convention To Prevent And Punish Torture <a href="http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/a-51.html">http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/a-51.html</a>
IAEP	Institutions and Elections Project Dataset. <a href="http://cdp.binghampton.edu/IAEP.htm">http://cdp.binghampton.edu/IAEP.htm</a>
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights <a href="http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&amp;subid=A&amp;lang=en">http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&amp;subid=A&amp;lang=en</a>
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

	<a href="http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=IV-3&amp;chapter=4&amp;lang=en">http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=IV-3&amp;chapter=4&amp;lang=en</a>
ICRG	International Country Risk Guide. <a href="http://www.prsqgroup.com/ICRG.aspx">http://www.prsqgroup.com/ICRG.aspx</a>
IDEA-F	Political Finance Database. International IDEA. <a href="http://www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/">http://www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/</a>
IDEA-T	Voter turnout. International IDEA. <a href="http://www.idea.int/vt">http://www.idea.int/vt</a>
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation. <a href="http://www.heritage.org/index">http://www.heritage.org/index</a>
ILO	International Labour Organization. <a href="http://www.ilo.org">http://www.ilo.org</a>
IMD	Institute for Management Development, Lausanne. The World Competitiveness Yearbook / Report. Executive Opinion Survey.
IPU	International Parliamentary Union. Parline database. <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline">http://www.ipu.org/parline</a>
IPU-Chronicles	Inter Parliamentary Union (various years). Chronicle of parliamentary elections. Vol (various). Geneva, CH: IPU.
IRI	Initiative and Referendum Institute. <a href="http://www.iandrinstute.org/">http://www.iandrinstute.org/</a>
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ISS	International Social Survey (2004) <a href="http://www.issp.org/">http://www.issp.org/</a>

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<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop>

LB	Latinobarometro. <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org">http://www.latinobarometro.org</a>
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MAR	Minorities at Risk Project. <a href="http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp">http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp</a>
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MT	Mondo Times. The Worldwide News Media Guide. <a href="http://www.mondotimes.com">http://www.mondotimes.com</a>
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ODG	Office of Democracy and Governance (2003): <i>Money in Politics Handbook: A guide to increasing transparency in emerging democ-</i>

	racies.
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe <a href="http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr-el/2009/07/38973_en.pdf">http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr-el/2009/07/38973_en.pdf</a>
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Partylaw	Party Law in Modern Europe. <a href="http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/">http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/</a>
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PDoA	Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown University. <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu">http://pdba.georgetown.edu</a>
PELA	Elites Parlamentarias de América Latina. <a href="http://americo.usal.es/oir/Elites/bases_de_datos.htm">http://americo.usal.es/oir/Elites/bases_de_datos.htm</a>
PTS	Political Terror Scale. <a href="http://www.politicalerrorscale.org">http://www.politicalerrorscale.org</a>
QoG	The Quality of Government Institute. <a href="http://www.qog.pol.gu.se">http://www.qog.pol.gu.se</a>
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UCI	University of California: The Election Turnout Database. <a href="http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/archive.php">http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/archive.php</a>
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. <a href="http://www.unece.org">http://www.unece.org</a>
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime <a href="http://www.unodc.org/">http://www.unodc.org/</a>
UNUDHR	United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml">http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml</a>
UNSTATS	United Nations Statistics Division. <a href="http://unstats.un.org">http://unstats.un.org</a>
USEP	United States Elections Project. <a href="http://elections.gmu.edu">http://elections.gmu.edu</a>
Vanhanen (2008)	Women's Representation in National Parliaments 1970-2008. <a href="http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD2183/meF2183.html">http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD2183/meF2183.html</a>
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<b>WB</b>	World Bank Statistics. <a href="http://data.worldbank.org">http://data.worldbank.org</a>
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<b>WGI</b>	Worldwide Governance Indicators. World Bank. <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp</a>
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization: SDR, homicide and intentional injury (different issues). <a href="http://www.who.int/research/en">http://www.who.int/research/en</a>
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<b>Wikipedia</b>	The Free Encyclopedia. <a href="http://www.wikipedia.org">http://www.wikipedia.org</a>
<b>WP</b>	Worldpress. <a href="http://www.worldpress.org">http://www.worldpress.org</a>
<b>WPT</b>	World Press Trends. Different issues. Paris: Zenithmedia.
<b>WVS</b>	World Values Survey.

WZB

<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

## Appendix 2: Selection of the Blueprint-Countries

The 30 countries that constitute our blueprint sample are chosen according to their Freedom House and Polity scores between 1995 and 2005. The following list illustrates our selection process.

Country	FREEDOM HOUSE (mean score of civil liberties and political rights)											POLITY										
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Australia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Austria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Belgium	1	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Canada	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Costa Rica	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Cyprus	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Czech Republic	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Denmark	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Finland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
France	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Germany	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Hungary	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Iceland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Italy	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Japan	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Malta	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
New Zealand	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Norway	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Poland	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	10	10
Portugal	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Slovenia	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
South Africa	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Spain	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Sweden	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
United Kingdom	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
United States	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

\* country is missing in Polity

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